WesawinChapterXhowtheconsciousnessofpersonalidentityreposedonit，thepresentthoughtfindinginitsmemoriesawarmthandintimacywhichitrecognizesasthesamewarmthandintimacyitnowfeels。Thissenseofidentityoftheknowingsubjectisheldbysomephilosopherstobetheonlyvehiclebywhichtheworldhangstogether。Itseemshardlynecessarytosaythatasenseofidentityoftheknownobjectwouldperformexactlythesameunifyingfunction，evenifthesenseofsubjectiveidentitywerelost。Andwithouttheintentiontothinkofthesameouterthingsoverandoveragain，andthesensethatweweredoingso，oursenseofourownpersonalsamenesswouldcarryusbutalittlewaytowardsmakingauniverseofourexperience。

Note，however，thatweareinthefirstinstancespeakingofthesenseofsamenessfromthepointofviewofthemind’sstructurealone，andnotfromthepointofviewoftheuniverse。Wearepsychologizing，notphilosophizing。

[p。460]Thatis，wedonotcarewhethertherebeanyrealsamenessinthingsornot，orwhetherthemindbetrueorfalseinitsassumptionsofit。Ourprincipleonlylaysitdownthatthemindmakescontinualuseofthenotionofsameness，andifdeprivedofit，wouldhaveadifferentstructurefromwhatithas。Inaword，theprinciplethatthemindcanmeantheSameistrueofitsmeanings，butnotnecessarilyofaughtbesides。[1]ThemindmustconceiveaspossiblethattheSameshouldbebeforeit，forourexperiencetobethesortofthingitis。Withoutthepsychologicalsenseofidentity，samenessmightraindownuponusfromtheouterworldforeverandwebenonethewiser。Withthepsychologicalsense，ontheotherhand，theouterworldmightbeanunbrokenflux，andyetweshouldperceivearepeatedexperience。Evennow，theworldmaybeaplaceinwhichthesamethingneverdidandneverwillcometwice。Thethingwemeantopointatmaychangefromtoptobottomandwebeignorantofthefact。Butinourmeaningitselfwearenotdeceived；ourintentionistothinkofthesame。ThenamewhichIhavegiventotheprinciple，incallingitthelawofconstancyinourmeanings，accentuatesitssubjectivecharacter，andjustifiesusinlayingitdownasthemostimportantofallthefeaturesofourmentalstructure。

Notallpsychiclifeneedbeassumedtohavethesenseofsamenessdevelopedinthisway。Intheconsciousnessofwormsandpolyps，thoughthesamerealitiesmayfrequentlyimpressit，thefeelingofsamenessmayseldomemerge。We，however，runningbackandforth，likespidersonthewebtheyweave，feelourselvestobeworkingoveridenticalmaterialsandthinkingthemindifferentways。Andthemanwhoidentifiesthematerialsmostisheldtohavethemostphilosophichumanmind。[p。461]CONCEPTIONDEFINED。ThefunctionbywhichwethusidentifyanumericallydistinctandpermanentsubjectofdisclosureiscalledCONCEPTION；andthethoughtswhichareitsvehiclesarecalledconcepts。Buttheword’concept’isoftenusedasifitstoodfortheobjectofdiscourseitself；andthisloosenessfeedssuchevasivenessindiscussionthatI

shallavoidtheuseoftheexpressionconceptaltogether，andspeakof’conceivingstateofmind，’orsomethingsimilar，instead。Theword’conception’

isunambiguous。Itproperlydenotesneitherthementalstatenorwhatthementalstatesignifies，buttherelationbetweenthetwo，namely，thefunctionofthementalstateinsignifyingjustthatparticularthing。Itisplainthatoneandthesamementalstatecanbethevehicleofmanyconceptions，canmeanaparticularthing，andagreatdealmorebesides。Ifithassuchamultipleconceptualfunction，itmaybecalledanactofcompoundconception。

Wemayconceiverealitiessupposedtobeextra-mental，assteam-engine；

fictions，asmermaid；ormereentiarationis，likedifferenceornonentity。Butwhateverwedoconceive，ourconceptionisofthatandnothingelse-nothingelse，thatis，insteadofthat，thoughitmaybeofmuchelseinadditiontothat。Eachactofconceptionresultsfromourattentionsinglingoutsomeonepartofthemassofmatterforthoughtwhichtheworldpresents，andholdingfasttoit，withoutconfusion。[2]

Confusionoccurswhen[p。462]wedonotknowwhetheracertainobjectproposedtousisthesamewithoneofourmeaningsornot；sothattheconceptualfunctionrequires，tobecomplete，thatthethoughtshouldnotonlysay’Imeanthis，’butalsosay’Idon’tmeanthat。’[3]

Eachconceptionthuseternallyremainswhatitis，andnevercanbecomeanother。Themindmaychangeitsstates，anditsmeanings，atdifferenttimes；maydroponeconceptionandtakeupanother，butthedroppedconceptioncaninnointelligiblesensebesaidtochangeintoitssuccessor。

Thepaper，amomentagowhite，Imaynowseetohavebeenscorchedblack。

Butmyconception’white’doesnotchangeintomyconception’black。’Onthecontrary，itstaysalongsideoftheobjectiveblackness，asadifferentmeaninginmymind，andbysodoingletsmejudgetheblacknessasthepaper’schange。Unlessitstayed，Ishouldsimplysay’blackness’andknownomore。Thus，amidthefluxofopinionsandofphysicalthings，theworldofconceptions，orthingsintendedtobethoughtabout，standsstiffandimmutable，likePlato’sRealmofIdeas。[4]

Someconceptionsareofthings，someofevents，someofqualities。Anyfact，beitthing，event，orquality，maybeconceivedsufficientlyforpurposesofidentification，ifonlyitbesingledoutandmarkedsoastoseparateitfromotherthings。Simplycallingit’this’or’that’willsuffice。[p。463]Tospeakintechnicallanguage，asubjectmaybeconceivedbyitsdenotation，withnoconnotation，oraveryminimumofconnotation，attached。Theessentialpointisthatitshouldbere-identifiedbyusasthatwhichthetalkisabout；andnofullrepresentationofitisnecessaryforthis，evenwhenitisafullyrepresentablething。

Inthissense，creaturesextremelylowintheintellectualscalemayhaveconception。Allthatisrequiredisthattheyshouldrecognizethesameexperienceagain。Apolypwouldbeaconceptualthinkerifafeelingof’Hollo！thingumbobagain！’everflittedthroughitsmind。

Mostoftheobjectsofourthought，however，aretosomedegreerepresentedaswellasmerelypointedout。Eithertheyarethingsandeventsperceivedorimagined，ortheyarequalitiesapprehendedinapositiveway。Evenwherewehavenointuitiveacquaintancewiththenatureofathing，ifweknowanyoftherelationsofitatall，anythingaboutit，thatisenoughtoindividualizeanddistinguishitfromalltheotherthingswhichwemightmean。Manyofourtopicsofdiscoursearethusproblematical，ordefinedbytheirrelationsonly。Wethinkofathingaboutwhichcertainfactsmustobtain，butwedonotyetknowhowthethingwilllookwhenitisrealized。Thusweconceiveofaperpetual-motionmachine。Itisaqu渟itumofaperfectlydefinitekind，-wecanalwaystellwhethertheactualmachinesofferedusdoordonotagreewithwhatwemeanbyit。Thenaturalpossibilityorimpossibilityofthethingdoesnottouchthequestionofitsconceivabilityinthisproblematicway。’Roundsquare，’’black-white-thing，’areabsolutelydefiniteconceptions；itisamereaccident，asfarasconceptiongoes，thattheyhappentostandforthingswhichnatureletsussensiblyperceive。[5][p。464]CONCEPTIONSAREUNCHANGEABLE。Thefactthatthesamerealtopicofdiscourseisatonetimeconceivedasamere’that’or’thatwhich，etc。，’andisatanothertimeconceivedwithadditionalspecifications，hasbeentreatedbymanyauthorsasaproofthatconceptionsthemselvesarefertileandself-developing。Aconception，accordingtotheHegelizersinphilosophy，’developsitsownsignificance，’

’makesexplicitwhatitimplicitlycontained，’passes，onoccasion，’overintoitsopposite，’andinshortlosesaltogethertheblanklyself-identicalcharacterwesupposedittomaintain。Thefigureweviewedasapolygonappearstousnowasasumofjuxtaposedtriangles；thenumberhithertoconceivedasthirteenisatlastnoticedtobesixplusseven，orprime；

themanthoughthonestisbelievedarogue。Suchchangesofouropinionareviewedbythesethinkersasevolutionsofourconception，fromwithin。

Thefactsareunquestionable；ourknowledgedoesgrowandchangebyrationalandinwardprocesses，aswellasbyempiricaldiscoveries。Wherethediscoveriesareempirical，noonepretendsthatthepropulsiveagency，theforcethatmakestheknowledgedevelop，ismereconception。Alladmitittobeourcontinuedexposuretothething，withitspowertoimpressoursenses。Thusstrychnin，whichtastesbitter，wefindwillalsokill，etc。NowIsaythatwherethenewknowledgemerelycomesfromthinking，thefactsareessentiallythesame，andthattotalkofself-developmentonthepartofourconceptionsisaverybadwayofstatingthecase。

Notnewsensations，asintheem-[p。465]piricalinstance，butnewconceptions，aretheindispensableconditionsofadvance。

Foriftheallegedcasesofself-developmentbeexamineditwillbefound，Ibelieve，thatthenewtruthaffirmsineverycasearelationbetweentheoriginalsubjectofconceptionandsomenewsubjectconceivedlateron。Thesenewsubjectsofconceptionariseinvariousways。Everyoneofourconceptionsisofsomethingwhichourattentionoriginallytoreoutofthecontinuumoffeltexperience，andprovisionallyisolatedsoastomakeofitanindividualtopicofdiscourse。Everyoneofthemhasaway，ifthemindisleftalonewithit，ofsuggestingotherpartsofthecontinuumfromwhichitwastorn，forconceptiontoworkuponinasimilarway。This’suggestion’isoftennomorethanwhatweshalllaterknowastheassociationofideas。Often，however，itisasortofinvitationtothemindtoplay，addlines，breaknumber-groups，etc。Whateveritis，itbringsnewconceptionsintoconsciousness，whichlatterthereuponmayormaynotexpresslyattendtotherelationinwhichthenewstandstotheold。ThusIhaveaconceptionofequidistantlines。Suddenly，Iknownotwhence，therepopsintomyheadtheconceptionoftheirmeeting。SuddenlyagainIthinkofthemeetingandtheequidistancebothtogether，andperceivethemincompatible。"Thoselineswillnevermeet，"Isay。Suddenlyagaintheword’parallel’popsintomyhead。’Theyareparallels，’Icontinue；

andsoon。Originalconceptionstostartwith；adventitiousconceptionspushedforwardbymultifariouspsychologiccauses；comparisonsandcombinationsofthetwo；resultantconceptionstoendwith；whichlattermaybeofeitherrationalorempiricalrelations。

Asregardstheserelations，theyareconceptionsoftheseconddegree，asonemightsay，andtheirbirthplaceistheminditself。InChapterXXVIII

Ishallatconsiderablelengthdefendthemind’sclaimtooriginalityandfertilityinbringingthemforth。Butnosingleoneofthemind’sconceptionsisfertileofitself，astheopinionwhichIcriticisepretends。

Whentheseveralnotesofachordaresoundedtogether，wegetanewfeelingfromtheircombination。Thisfeelingisduetothemindreactinguponthat[p。466]groupofsoundsinthatdeterminateway，andnoonewouldthinkofsayingofanysinglenoteofthechordthatit’developed’ofitselfintotheothernotesorintothefeelingofharmony。SoofConceptions。

Nooneofthemdevelopsintoanyother。Butiftwoofthemarethoughtatonce，theirrelationmaycometoconsciousness，andformmatterforathirdconception。

Take’thirteen’forexample，whichissaidtodevelopinto’prime。’

Whatreallyhappensisthatwecomparetheutterlychangelessconceptionofthirteenwithvariousotherconceptions，thoseofthedifferentmultiplesoftwo，three，four，five，andsix，andascertainthatitdiffersfromthemall。Suchdifferenceisafreshlyascertainedrelation。Itisonlyformerebrevity’ssakethatwecallitapropertyoftheoriginalthirteen，thepropertyofbeingprime。Weshallseeinthenextchapterthat(ifwecountout&aelig；stheticandmoralrelationsbetweenthings)theonlyimportantrelationsofwhichthemereinspectionofconceptionsmakesusawarearerelationsofcomparison，thatis，ofdifferenceandno-difference，betweenthem。Thejudgment6+7=13expressestherelationofequalitybetweentwoidealobjects，13ontheonehandand6+7ontheother，successivelyconceivedandcompared。Thejudgments6+7>12，or6+7<14，expressinlikemannerrelationsofinequalitybetweenidealobjects。Butifitbeunfairtosaythattheconceptionof6+7generatesthatof12

orof14，surelyitisasunfairtosaythatitgeneratesthatof13。

Theconceptionsof12，13，and14areeachandallgeneratedbyindividualactsofthemind，playingwithitsmaterials。When，comparingtwoidealobjects，wefindthemequal，theconceptionofoneofthemmaybethatofawholeandoftheotherthatofallitsparts。Thisparticularcaseis，itseemstome，theonlycasewhichmakesthenotionofoneconceptionevolvingintoanothersoundplausible。Buteveninthiscasetheconception，assuch，ofthewholedoesnotevolveintotheconception，assuch，oftheparts。Lettheconceptionofsomeobjectasawholebegivenfirst。

Tobeginwith，itpointstoandidentifiesforfuturethoughtacertainthat。The’whole’inquestionmightbeoneofthosemechanicalpuzzlesofwhichthedifficultyistoun-[p。467]locktheparts。Inthiscase，nobodywouldpretendthatthericherandmoreelaborateconceptionwhichwegainofthepuzzleaftersolvingitcamedirectlyoutofourfirstcrudeconceptionofit，foritisnotoriouslytheoutcomeofexperimentingwithourhands。Itistruethat，astheybothmeanthatsamepuzzle，ourearlierthoughtandourlaterthoughthaveoneconceptualfunction，arevehiclesofoneconception。Butinadditiontobeingthevehicleofthisbaldunchangingconception，’thatsamepuzzle，’thelaterthoughtisthevehicleofallthoseotherconceptionswhichittookthemanualexperimentationtoacquire。Now，itisjustthesamewherethewholeismathematicalinsteadofbeingmechanical。Letitbeapolygonalspace，whichwecutintotriangles，andofwhichwethenaffirmthatitisthosetriangles。Heretheexperimentation(althoughusuallydonebyapencilinthehands)maybedonebytheunaidedimagination。Weholdthespace，firstconceivedaspolygonalsimply，inourmind’seyeuntilourattentionwanderingtoandfrowithinithascarveditintothetriangles。Thetrianglesareanewconception，theresultofthisnewoperation。Havingonceconceivedthem，however，andcomparedthemwiththeoldpolygonwhichweoriginallyconceivedandwhichwehaveneverceasedconceiving，wejudgethemtofitexactlyintoitsarea。Theearlierandlaterconceptions，wesay，areofoneandthesamespace。Butthisrelationbetweentrianglesandpolygonwhichthemindcannothelpfindingifitcomparesthematall，isverybadlyexpressedbysayingthattheoldconceptionhasdevelopedintothenew。Newconceptionscomefromnewsensations，newmovements，newemotions，newassociations，newactsofattention，andnewcomparisonsofoldconceptions，andnotinotherways，Endogenousprolificationisnotamodeofgrowthtowhichconceptionscanlayclaim。

Ihope，therefore，thatIshallnotbeaccusedofhuddlingmysteriesoutofsight，whenIinsistthatthepsychologyofconceptionisnottheplaceinwhichtotreatofthoseofcontinuityandchange。Conceptionsformtheoneclassofentitiesthatcannotunderanycircumstanceschange。

Theycanceasetobe，altogether；ortheycanstay，aswhat[p。468]theyseverallyare；butthereisforthemnomiddleway。Theyformanessentiallydiscontinuoussystem，andtranslatetheprocessofourperceptualexperience，whichisnaturallyaflux，intoasetofstagnantandpetrifiedterms。

Theveryconceptionoffluxitselfisanabsolutelychangelessmeaninginthemind:itsignifiesjustthatonething，flux，immovably-And，withthis，thedoctrineofthefluxoftheconceptmaybedismissed，andneednotoccupyourattentionagain。[6]’ABSTRACT’IDEAS。Wehavenowtopasstoalessexcusablemistake。Therearephilosopherswhodenythatassociatedthingscanbebrokenasunderatall，evenprovisionally，bytheconceivingmind。TheopinionknownasNominalismsaysthatwereallyneverframeanyconceptionofthepartialelementsofanexperience，butarecompelled，wheneverwethinkit，tothinkitinitstotality，justasitcame。

Iwillbesilentofmedi&aelig；valNominalism，andbeginwithBerkeley，whoissupposedtohaverediscoveredthedoc-[p。469]trineforhimself。

Hisasseverationsagainst’abstractideas’areamongtheoftenestquotedpassagesinphilosophicliterature。

"Itisagreed，"hesays，"onallhandsthatthequalitiesormodesofthingsdoneverreallyexisteachofthemapartbyitself，andseparatedfromallothers，butaremixed，asitwere，andblendedtogether，severalinthesameobject。But，wearetold，themindbeingabletoconsidereachqualitysingly，orabstractedfromthoseotherqualitieswithwhichitisunited，doesbythatmeansframetoitselfabstractideas……Afterthismanner，itissaid，wecomebytheabstractideaofman，or，ifyouplease，humanity，orhumannature；whereinitistruethereisincludedcolor，becausethereisnomanbuthassomecolor，butthenitcanbeneitherwhite，norblack，noranyparticularcolor，becausethereisnooneparticularcolorwhereinallmenpartake。Solikewisethereisincludedstature，butthenitisneithertallstaturenorlowstature，noryetmiddlestature，butsomethingabstractedfromallthese。Andsooftherest……Whetherothershavethiswonderfulfacultyofabstractingtheirideas，theybestcantell:formyself，IfindindeedIhaveafacultyofimaginingorrepresentingtomyselftheideasofthoseparticularthingsIhaveperceivedandofvariouslycompoundinganddividingthem……Icanconsiderthehand，theeye，thenose，eachbyitselfabstractedorseparatedfromtherestofthebody。Butthen，whateverhandoreyeIimagine，itmusthavesomeparticularshapeandcolor。LikewisetheideaofmanthatIframetomyselfmustbeeitherofawhite，orablack，oratawny，astraight，oracrooked，atall，oralow，oramiddle-sizedman。Icannotbyanyeffortofthoughtconceivetheabstractideaabovedescribed。Anditisequallyimpossibleformetoformtheabstractideaofmotiondistinctfromthebodymoving，andwhichisneitherswiftnorslow，curvilinearnorrectilinear；andthelikemaybesaidofallotherabstractgeneralideaswhatsoever……

Andthereisgroundtothinkmostmenwillacknowledgethemselvestobeinmycase。Thegeneralityofmenwhicharesimpleandilliterateneverpretendtoabstractnotions。Itissaidtheyaredifficult，andnottobeattainedwithoutpainsandstudy……NowIwouldfainknowatwhattimeitismenareemployedinsurmountingthatdifficulty，andfurnishingthemselveswiththosenecessaryhelpsfordiscourse。Itcannotbewhentheyaregrownup，forthenitseemstheyarenotconsciousofanysuchpainstaking；itremainsthereforetobethebusinessoftheirchildhood。

Andsurelythegreatandmultipliedlaborofframingabstractnotionswillbefoundahardtaskforthattenderage。Isitnotahardthingtoimaginethatacoupleofchildrencannotpratetogetheroftheirsugar-plumsandrattlesandtherestoftheirlittletrinkets，tilltheyhavefirsttackedtogethernumberlessinconsistencies，andsoframedintheirmindsabstractgeneralideas，andannexedthemtoeverycommonnametheymakeuseof？"[7]

[p。470]Thenote，sobravelystruckbyBerkeley，couldnot，however，bewellsustainedinfaceofthefactpatenttoeveryhumanbeingthatwecanmeancolorwithoutmeaninganyparticularcolor，andstaturewithoutmeaninganyparticularheight。JamesMill，tobesure，chimesinheroicallyinthechapteronClassificationofhis’Analysis’；butinhissonJohnthenominalisticvoicehasgrownsoweakthat，although’abstractideas’arerepudiatedasamatteroftraditionalform，theopinionsutteredarereallynothingbutaconceptualismashamedtocallitselfbyitsownlegitimatename。[8]Conceptualismsaysthemindcanconceiveanyqualityorrelationitpleases，andmeannothingbutit，inisolationfromeverythingelseintheworld。Thisis，ofcourse，thedoctrinewhichwehaveprofessed。

JohnMillsays:

"TheformationofaConceptdoesnotconsistinseparatingtheattributeswhicharesaidtocomposeitfromallotherattributesofthesameobject，andenablingustoconceivethoseattributes，disjoinedfromanyothers。

Weneitherconceivethem，northinkthem，norcognizetheminanyway，asathingapart，butsolelyasforming，incombinationwithnumerousotherattributes，theideaofanindividualobject。But，thoughmeaningthemonlyaspartofalargeragglomeration，wehavethepoweroffixingoutattentiononthem，totheneglectoftheotherattributeswithwhichwethinkthemcombined。Whiletheconcentrationofattentionlasts，ifitissufficientlyintense，wemaybetemporarilyunconsciousofanyoftheotherattributes，andmayreally，forabriefinterval，havenothingpresenttoourmindbuttheattributesconstituentoftheconcept……Generalconcepts，therefore，wehave，properlyspeaking，none；wehaveonlycomplexideasofobjectsintheconcrete:butweareabletoattendexclusivelytocertainpartsoftheconcreteidea:andbythatexclusiveattentionweenablethosepartstodetermineexclusivelythecourseofourthoughtsassubsequentlycalledupbyassociation；

andareinaconditiontocarryonatrainofmeditationorreasoningrelatingtothosepartsonly，exactlyasifwewereabletoconceivethemseparatelyfromtherest。"[9]

ThisisalovelyexampleofMill’swayofholdingpiouslytohisgeneralstatements，butconcedingindetailallthattheiradversariesask。Iftherebeabetterdescriptionextant，ofamindinpossessionofan’abstractidea，’thanis[p。471]containedinthewordsIhaveitalicized，Iamunacquaintedwithit。TheBerkeleyannominalismthusbreaksdown。

Itiseasytolaybarethefalseassumptionwhichunderliesthewholediscussionofthequestionashithertocarriedon。Thatassumptionisthatideas，inordertoknow，mustbecastintheexactlikenessofwhateverthingstheyknow，andthattheonlythingsthatcanbeknownarethosewhichideascanresemble。Theerrorhasnotbeenconfinedtonominalists。Omniscognitofitperassimilationemcognoscentisetcognitihasbeenthemaxim，moreorlessexplicitlyassumed，ofwritersofeveryschool。

Practicallyitamountstosayingthatanideamustbeaduplicateeditionofwhatitknows[10]-inotherwords，thatitcanonlyknowitself-or，moreshortlystill，thatknowledgeinanystrictsenseoftheword，asaself-transcendentfunction，isimpossible。

Nowourownbluntstatementsabouttheultimatenessofthecognitiverelation，andthedifferencebetweenthe’object’ofthethoughtanditsmere’topic’or’subjectofdiscourse’(cf。pp。275ff。)，areallatvariancewithanysuchtheory；andweshallfindmoreandmoreoccasion，asweadvanceinthisbook，todenyitsgeneraltruth。Allthatastateofmindneeddo，inordertotakecognizanceofareality，intendit，orbe’about’

it，istoleadtoaremoterstateofmindwhicheitheractsupontherealityorresemblesit。Theonlyclassofthoughtswhichcanwithanyshowofplausibilitybesaidtoresembletheirobjectsaresensations。Thestuffofwhichallourotherthoughtsarecomposedissymbolic，andathoughtattestsitspertinencytoatopicbysimplyterminating，soonerorlater，inasensationwhichresemblesthelatter。

ButMillandtherestbelievethatathoughtmustbewhatitmeans，andmeanwhatitis，andthatifitbeapictureofanentireindividual，itcannotmeananypartofhimtotheexclusionoftherest。

Isaynothinghereofthepreposterouslyfalsedescriptivepsychologyinvolvedinthestatementthattheonlythingswecanmentallypictureare[p。472]

individualscompletelydeterminateinallregards。ChapterXVIIIwillhavesomethingtosayonthatpoint，andwecanignoreithere。Forevenifitweretruethatourimageswerealwaysofconcreteindividuals，itwouldnotintheleastfollowthatourmeaningswereofthesame。

Thesenseofourmeaningisanentirelypeculiarelementofthethought。

Itisoneofthoseevanescentand’transitive’factsofmindwhichintrospectioncannotturnroundupon，andisolateandholdupforexamination，asanentomologistpassesroundaninsectonapin。Inthe(somewhatclumsy)

terminologyIhaveused，itpertainstothe’fringe’ofthesubjectivestate，andisa’feelingoftendency，’whoseneuralcounterpartisundoubtedlyalotofdawninganddyingprocessestoofaintandcomplextobetraced。

Thegeometer，withhisonedefinitefigurebeforehim，knowsperfectlythathisthoughtsapplytocountlessotherfiguresaswell，andthatalthoughheseeslinesofacertainspecialbigness，direction，color，etc。，hemeansnotoneofthesedetails。WhenIusethewordmanintwodifferentsentences，Imayhavebothtimesexactlythesamesounduponmylipsandthesamepictureinmymentaleye，butImaymean，andattheverymomentofutteringthewordandimaginingthepicture，knowthatI

mean，twoentirelydifferentthings。ThuswhenIsay:"WhatawonderfulmanJonesis！"IamperfectlyawarethatImeanbymantoexcludeNapoleonBonaparteorSmith。ButwhenIsay:"WhatawonderfulthingManis！"I

amequallywellawarethatImeantoincludenotonlyJones，butNapoleonandSmithaswell。Thisaddedconsciousnessisanabsolutelypositivesortoffeeling，transformingwhatwouldotherwisebemerenoiseorvisionintosomethingunderstood；anddeterminingthesequelofmythinking，thelaterwordsandimages，inaperfectlydefiniteway。WesawinChapterIXthattheimageperse，thenucleus，isfunctionallytheleastimportantpartofthethought。Ourdoctrine，therefore，ofthe’fringe’leadstoaperfectlysatisfactorydecisionofthenominalisticandconceptualisticcontroversy，sofarasittouchespsychology。Wemustdecideinfavoroftheconceptualists，andaffirmthatthepowertothinkthings，qualities，relations，orwhateverotherelementstheremay[p。473]be，isolatedandabstractedfromthetotalexperienceinwhichtheyappear，isthemostindisputablefunctionofourthought。UNIVERSALS。Afterabstractions，universals！The’fringe，’whichletsusbelieveintheone，letsusbelieveintheothertoo。Anindividualconceptionisofsomethingrestricted，initsapplication，toasinglecase。Auniversalorgeneralconceptionisofanentireclass，orofsomethingbelongingtoanentireclass，ofthings。Theconceptionofanabstractqualityis，takenbyitself，neitheruniversalnorparticular。[11]IfIabstractwhitefromtherestofthewintrylandscapethismorning，itisaperfectlydefiniteconception，aself-identicalqualitywhichImaymeanagain；but，asI

havenotyetindividualizeditbyexpresslymeaningtorestrictittothisparticularsnow，northoughtatallofthepossibilityofotherthingstowhichitmaybeapplicable，itissofarnothingbuta’that，’a’floatingadjective，’asMr。Bradleycallsit，oratopicbrokenoutfromtherestoftheworld。Properlyitis，inthisstate，asingular-Ihave’singleditout；’andwhen，later，Iuniversalizeorindividualizeitsapplication，andmythoughtturnstomeaneitherthiswhiteorallpossiblewhites，Iaminrealitymeaningtwonewthingsandformingtwonewconceptions。[12]

SuchanalterationofmymeaninghasnothingtodowithanychangeintheimageImayhaveinmymentaleye，butsolelywiththevagueconsciousnessthatsurroundstheimage，ofthespheretowhichisisintendedtoapply。

Wecangivenomoredefiniteaccountofthisvagueconscious-[p。474]

nessthanhasbeengivenonpp。249-266。Butthatisnoreasonfordenyingitspresence。[13]

Butthenominalistsandtraditionalconceptualistsfindmatterforaninveteratequarrelinthesesimplefacts。Fulloftheirnotionthatanidea，feeling，orstateofconsciousnesscanatbottomonlybeawareofitsownquality；andagreeing，astheybothdo，thatsuchanideaorstateofconsciousnessisaperfectlydeterminate，singular，andtransitorything；

theyfinditimpossibletoconceivehowitshouldbecomethevehicleofaknowledgeofanythingpermanentoruniversal。"Toknowauniversal，itmustbeuniversal；forlikecanonlybeknownbylike，"etc。Unabletoreconciletheseincompatibles，theknowerandtheknown，eachsideimmolatesoneofthemtosavetheother。Thenominalists’settlethehash’ofthethingknownbydenyingittobeeveragenuineuniversal；theconceptualistsdespatchtheknowerbydenyingittobeastateofmind，inthesenseofbeingaperishingsegmentofthoughts’stream，consubstantialwithotherfactsofsensibility。Theyinvent，insteadofit，asthevehicleoftheknowledgeofuniversals，anactuspurusintellect&ucirc；s，oranEgo，whosefunctionistreatedasquasi-miraculousandnothingifnotawe-inspiring，andwhichitisasortofblasphemytoapproachwiththeintenttoexplainandmakecommon，orreducetolowerterms。Invokedinthefirstinstanceasavehiclefortheknowledgeofuniversals，thehigherprinciplepresentlyismadetheindispensiblevehicleofallthinkingwhatever，for，itiscontended，"auniversalelementispresentineverythought。"Thenominalistsmeanwhile，whodislike[p。475]actuspurosandawe-inspiringprinciplesanddespisethereverentialmood，contentthemselveswithsayingthatwearemistakeninsupposingweevergetsightofthefaceofanuniversal；

andthatwhatdeludesusisnothingbuttheswarmof’individualideas’

whichmayatanytimebeawakendbythehearingofaname。

Ifweopenthepagesofeitherschool，wefinditimpossibletotell，inallthewhirlaboutuniversalandparticular，whentheauthoristalkingaboutuniversalsinthemind，andwhenaboutobjectiveuniversals，sostrangelyarethetwomixedtogether。JamesFerrier，forexample，isthemostbrilliantofanti-nominalistwriters。Butwhoisnimble-wittedenoughtocount，inthefollowingsentencesfromhim，thenumberoftimeshestepsfromtheknowntotheknower，andattributestobothwhateverpropertieshefindsineitherone？

"Tothinkistopassfromthesingularorparticulartotheidea[concept]

oruniversal……Ideasarenecessarybecausenothinkingcantakeplacewithoutthem。Theyareuniversal，inasmuchastheyarecompletelydivestedoftheparticularitywhichcharacterizesallthephenomenaofmeresensation。

Tograspthenatureofthisuniversalityisnoteasy。Perhapsthebestmeansbywhichthisendmaybecompassedisbycontrastingitwiththeparticular。Itisnotdifficulttounderstandthatasensation，aphenomenonofsense，isnevermorethantheparticularwhichitis。Assuch，thatis，initsstrictparticularity，itisabsolutelyunthinkable。Intheveryactofbeingthought，somethingmorethanitemerges，andthissomethingmorecannotbeagaintheparticular……Tenparticularspersecannotbethoughtofanymorethanoneparticularcanbethoughtof；……therealwaysemergesinthoughtanadditionalsomething，whichisthepossibilityofotherparticularstoanindefiniteextent……Theindefiniteadditionalsomethingwhichtheyareinstancesofisauniversal……

Theideaoruniversalcannotpossiblybepicturedintheimagination，forthiswouldatoncereduceittotheparticular……Thisinabilitytoformanysortofpictureorrepresentationofanideadoesnotproceedfromanyimperfectionorlimitationofourfaculties，butisaqualityinherentintheverynatureofintelligence。Acontradictionisinvolvedinthesuppositionthatanideaorauniversalcanbecometheobjecteitherofsenseoroftheimagination。Anideaisthusdiametricallyopposedtoanimage。"[14]

Thenominalists，ontheirside，admitaquasi-universal，somethingwhichwethinkasifitwereuniversal，thoughit[p。476]isnot；

andinallthattheysayaboutthissomething，whichtheyexplaintobe’anindefinitenumberofparticularideas，’thesamevacillationbetweenthesubjectiveandtheobjectivepointsofviewappears。Thereadernevercantellwhetheran’idea’spokenofissupposedtobeaknoweroraknown。

Theauthorsthemselvesdonotdistinguish。Theywanttogetsomethinginthemindwhichshallresemblewhatisoutofthemind，howevervaguely，andtheythinkthatwhenthatfactisaccomplished，nofartherquestionswillbeasked。JamesMillwrites:[15]

"Theword，man，weshallsay，isfirstappliedtoanindividual；itisfirstassociatedwiththeideaofthatindividual，andacquiresthepowerofcallinguptheideaofhim；itisnextappliedtoanotherindividualandacquiresthepowerofcallinguptheideaofhim；soofanotherandanother，tillithasbecomeassociatedwithanindefinitenumber，andhasacquiredthepowerofcallingupanindefinitenumberofthoseideasindifferently。

Whathappens？Itdoescallupanindefinitenumberoftheideasofindividualsasoftenasitoccurs；andcallingthemincloseconnection，itformsaspeciesofcomplexideaofthem……Itisalsoafact，thatwhenanideabecomestoacertainextentcomplex，fromthemultiplicityoftheideasitcomprehends，itisofnecessityindistinct；……andthisindistinctnesshas，doubtless，beenamaincauseofthemysterywhichhasappearedtobelongtoit……Itthusappearsthatthewordmanisnotawordhavingaverysimpleidea，aswastheopinionoftherealists；

norawordhavingnoideaatall，aswasthatofthe[earlier]nominalists；

butawordcallingupanindefinitenumberofideas，bytheirresistiblelawsofassociation，andformingthemintooneverycomplexanddistinct，butnotthereforeunintelligible，idea。"

Berkeleyhadalreadysaid:[16]

"Awordbecomesgeneralbybeingmadethesign，notofanabstractgeneralidea，butofmanyseveralparticularideas，anyoneofwhichitindifferentlysuggeststothemind。Anideawhich，consideredinitself，isparticular，becomesgeneralbybeingmadetorepresentorstandforallotherparticularideasofthesamesort。"

’Standfor，’notknow；’becomesgeneral，’notbecomesawareofsomethinggeneral；’particularideas，’notparticularthings-everywherethesametimidityaboutbeggingthefactofknowing，andthepitifullyimpotentattempttofoistitintheshapeofamodeofbeingof’ideas。’If[p。477]thefacttobeconceivedbetheindefinitelynumerousactualandpossiblemembersofaclass，thenitisassumedthatifwecanonlygetenoughideastohuddletogetherforamomentinthemind，thebeingofeachseveraloneofthemtherewillbeanequivalentfortheknowing，ormeaning，ofonememberoftheclassinquestion；andtheirnumberwillbesolargeastoconfuseourtallyandleaveitdoubtfulwhetherallthepossiblemembersoftheclasshavethusbeensatisfactorilytoldoffornot。

Ofcoursethisisnonsense。Anideaneitheriswhatitknows，norknowswhatitis；norwillswarmsofcopiesofthesame’idea，’recurringinstereotypedform，or’bytheirresistiblelawsofassociationformedintooneidea，’everbethesamethingasathoughtof’allthepossiblemembers’ofaclass。Wemustmeanthatbyanaltogetherspecialbitofconsciousnessadhoc。ButitiseasytotranslateBerkeley’s，Hume’s，andMill’snotionofaswarmofideasintocerebralterms，andsotomakethemstandforsomethingreal；and，inthissense，Ithinkthedoctrineoftheseauthorslesshollowthantheoppositeonewhichmakesthevehicleofuniversalconceptionstobeanactuspurusofthesoul。Ifeach’idea’standforsomespecialnascentnerve-process，thentheaggregateofthesenascentprocessesmighthaveforitsconsciouscorrelateapsychic’fringe，’whichshouldbejustthatuniversalmeaning，orintentionthatthenameormentalpictureemployedshouldmeanallthepossibleindividualsoftheclass。Everypeculiarcomplicationofbrain-processesmusthavesomepeculiarcorrelateinthesoul。Toonesetofprocesseswillcorrespondthethoughtofanindefinitetakingoftheextentofawordlikeman；

toanothersetthatofaparticulartaking；andtoathirdsetthatofauniversaltaking，oftheextentofthesameword。Thethoughtcorrespondingtoeithersetofprocesses，isalwaysitselfauniqueandsingularevent，whosedependenceonitspeculiarnerve-processIofcourseamfarfromprofessingtoexplain。[17]

[p。478]Trulyincomparisonwiththefactthateveryconception，whateveritbeof，isoneofthemind’simmutableposses-

[p。479]sions，thequestionwhetherasinglething，orawholeclassofthings，oronlyanunassignedquality，bemeantbyit，isaninsignificantmatterofdetail。Ourmeaningsareofsingulars，particulars，indefinites，anduniversals，mixedtogetherineveryway。Asingularindividualisasmuchconceivedwhenheisisolatedandidentifiedawayfromtherestoftheworldinmymind，asisthemostrarefiedanduniversallyapplicablequalityhemaypossess-being，forexample，whentreatedinthesameway。[18]Fromeverypointofview，theoverwhelmingandportentouscharacterascribedtouniversalconceptionsissurprising。Why，fromPlatoandAristotledownwards，philosophersshouldhaveviedwitheachotherinscornoftheknowledgeoftheparticular，andinadorationofthatofthegeneral，ishardtounderstand，seeingthatthemoreadorableknowledgeoughttobethatofthemoreadorablethings，andthatthethingsofworthareallconcretesandsingulars。Theonlyvalueofuniversalcharactersisthattheyhelpus，byreasoning，[p。480]toknownewtruthsaboutindividualthings。Therestrictionofone’smeaning，moreover，toanindividualthing，probablyrequiresevenmorecomplicatedbrain-processesthanitsextensiontoalltheinstancesofakind；andthemeremystery，assuch，oftheknowledge，isequallygreat，whethergeneralsorsingularsbethethingsknown。Insum，therefore，thetraditionaluniversal-worshipcanonlybecalledabitofperversesentimentalism，aphilosophic’idolofthecave。’

Itmayseemhardlynecessarytoadd(whatfollowsasamatterofcoursefrompp。229-237，andwhathasbeenimpliedinourassertionsallalong)

thatnothingcanbeconceivedtwiceoverwithoutbeingconceivedinentirelydifferentstatesofmind。Thus，myarm-chairisoneofthethingsofwhichIhaveaconception；IknewityesterdayandrecognizeditwhenIlookedatit。ButifIthinkofitto-dayasthesamearm-chairwhichIlookedatyesterday，itisobviousthattheveryconceptionofitasthesameisanadditionalcomplicationtothethought，whoseinwardconstitutionmustalterinconsequence。Inshort，itislogicallyimpossiblethatthesamethingshouldbeknownasthesamebytwosuccessivecopiesofthesamethought。Asamatteroffact，thethoughtsbywhichweknowthatwemeanthesamethingareapttobeverydifferentindeedfromeachother。Wethinkthethingnowinonecontext，nowinanother；

nowinadefiniteimage，nowinasymbol。Sometimesoursenseofitsidentitypertainstothemerefringe，sometimesitinvolvesthenucleus，ofourthought。Wenevercanbreakthethoughtasunderandtelljustwhichoneofitsbitsisthepartthatletsusknowwhichsubjectisreferredto；

butneverthelesswealwaysdoknowwhichofallpossiblesubjectswehaveinmind。Introspectivepsychologymustherethrowupthesponge；

thefluctuationsofsubjectivelifearetooexquisitetobearrestedbyitscoarsemeans。Itmustconfineitselftobearingwitnesstothefactthatallsortsofdifferentsubjectivestatesdoformthevehiclebywhichthesameisknown；anditmustcontradicttheoppositeview。

TheordinaryPsychologyof’ideas’constantlytalksas[p。481]ifthevehicleofthesamething-knownmustbethesamerecurrentstateofmind，andasifthehavingoveragainofthesame’idea’werenotonlyanecessarybutasufficientconditionformeaningthesamethingtwice。Butthisrecurrenceofthesameideawouldutterlydefeattheexistenceofarepeatedknowledgeofanything。Itwouldbeasimplereversionintoapre-existantstate，withnothinggainedintheinterval，andwithcompleteunconsciousnessofthestatehavingexistedbefore。Suchisnotthewayinwhichwethink。

Asarulewearefullyawarethatwehavethoughtbeforeofthethingwethinkofnow。Thecontinuityandpermanencyofthetopicisoftheessenceofourintellection。Werecognizetheoldproblem，andtheoldsolutions；

andwegoontoalterandimproveandsubstituteonepredicateforanotherwithouteverlettingthesubjectchange。

Thisiswhatismeantwhenitissaidthatthinkingconsistsinmakingjudgments。Asuccessionofjudgmentsmayallbeaboutthesamething。

Thegeneralpracticalpostulatewhichencouragesustokeepthinkingatallisthatbygoingontodosoweshalljudgebetterofthesamethingsthanifwedonot。[19]Inthesuccessivejudgments，allsortsofnewoperationsareperformedonthethings，andallsortsofnewresultsbroughtout，withoutthesenseofthemaintopicevergettinglost。Attheoutset，wemerelyhavethetopic；thenweoperateonit；andfinallywehaveitagaininaricherandtruerway。Acompoundconceptionhasbeensubstitutedforthesimpleone，butwithfullconsciousnessthatbothareoftheSame。

Thedistinctionbetweenhavingandoperatingisasnaturalinthementalasinthematerialworld。Asourhandsmayholdabitofwoodandaknife，andyetdonaughtwitheither；soourmindmaysimplybeawareofathing’sexistence，andyetneitherattendtoitnordiscriminateit，neitherlocatenorcountnorcomparenorlikenordislikenordeduceit，norrecognizeitarticulatelyashavingbeenmetwithbefore。Atthesametimeweknowthat，insteadofstaringatitinthisentrancedandsenselessway，wemayrallyouractivityinamoment，andlocate，class，[p。482]compare，count，andjudgeit。Thereisnothinginvolvedinallthiswhichwedidnotpostulateattheveryoutsetofourintrospectivework:realities，namely，extramentem，thoughts，andpossiblerelationsofcognitionbetweenthetwo。Theresultofthethoughts’operatingonthedatagiventosenseistotransformtheorderinwhichexperiencecomesintoanentirelydifferentorder，thatoftheconceivedworld。Thereisnospotoflight，forexample，whichIpickoutandproceedtodefineasapebble，whichisnottherebytornfromitsmeretime-andspace-neighbors，andthoughtinconjunctionwiththingsphysicallypartedfromitbythewidthofnature。Comparetheforminwhichfactsappearinatext-bookofphysics，aslogicallysubordinatedlaws，withthatinwhichwenaturallymaketheiracquaintance。Theconceptualschemeisasortofsieveinwhichwetrytogatheruptheworld’scontents。Mostfactsandrelationsfallthroughitsmeshes，beingeithertoosubtleorinsignificanttobefixedinanyconception。Butwheneveraphysicalrealityiscaughtandidentifiedasthesamewithsomethingalreadyconceived，itremainsonthesieve，andallthepredicatesandrelationsoftheconceptionwithwhichitisidentifiedbecomeitspredicatesandrelationstoo；itissubjectedtothesieve’snetwork，inotherwords。ThuscomestopasswhatMr。Hodgsoncallsthetranslationoftheperceptualintotheconceptualorderoftheworld。[20]

InChapterXXIIweshallseehowthistranslationalwaystakesplaceforthesakeofsomesubjectiveinterest，andhowtheconceptionwithwhichwehandleabitofsensibleexperienceisreallynothingbutateleologicalinstrument。Thiswholefunctionofconceiving，offixing，andholdingfasttomeanings，hasnosignificanceapartfromthefactthattheconceiverisacreaturewithpartialpurposesandprivateends。

Thereremains，therefore，muchmoretobesaidaboutconception，butforthepresentthiswillsuffice。

Footnotes[1]Therearetwoother’principlesofidentity’inphilosophy。

Theontologicaloneassertsthateveryrealthingiswhatitis，thataisa，andb，b。Thelogicalonesaysthatwhatisoncetrueofthesubjectofajudgmentisalwaystrueofthatsubject。Theontologicallawisatautologicaltruism；thelogicalprincipleisalreadymore，foritimpliessubjectsunalterablebytime。

Thepsychologicallawalsoimpliesfactswhichmightnotberealized:

theremightbenosuccessionofthoughts；oriftherewere，thelateronesmightnotthinkoftheearlier；oriftheydid，theymightnotrecallthecontentthereof；or，recallingthecontent，theymightnottakeitas’thesame’withanythingelse。

[2]Inlaterchaptersweshallseethatdeterminaterelationsexistbetweenthevariousdatathusfixeduponbythemind。Thesearecalledapriorioraxiomaticrelations。Simpleinspectionofthedataenablesustoperceivethem；andoneinspectionisaseffectiveasamillionforengenderinginustheconvictionthatbetweenthosedatathatrelationmustalwayshold。Tochangetherelationweshouldhavetomakethedatadifferent。’Theguaranteefortheuniformityandadequacy’ofthedatacanonlybethemind’sownpowertofixuponanyobjectivecontent，andtomeanthatcontentasoftenasitlikes。Thisrightofthemindto’construct’permanentidealobjectsforitselfoutofthedataofexperienceseems，singularlyenough，tobeastumbling-blocktomany。ProfessorRobertsoninhisclearandinstructivearticle’Axioms’

intheEncyclopediaBritannica(9thedition)suggeststhatitmayonlybewheremovementsenterintotheconstitutionoftheidealobject(astheydoingeometricalfigures)thatwecan"maketheultimaterelationstobewhatforustheymustbeinallcircumstances。"Hemakes，itistrue，aconcessioninfavorofconceptionsofnumberabstractedfrom"subjectiveoccurrencessucceedingeachotherintime"becausethesealsoareacts"ofconstruction，dependentonthepowerwehaveofvoluntarilydeterminingtheflowofsubjectiveconsciousness。""Thecontentofpassivesensation，"ontheotherhand，"mayindefinitelyvarybeyondanycontrolofours。"Whatifitdovary，solongaswecancontinuetothinkofandmeanthequalitiesitvariedfrom？Wecan’make’idealobjectsforourselvesoutofirrecoverablebitsofpassiveexperiencequiteasperfectlyasoutofeasilyrepeatableactiveexperiences。Andwhenwehavegotourobjectstogetherandcomparedthem，wedonotmake，butfind，theirrelations。

[3]Cf。Hodgson，TimeandSpace，&sect；46。Lotze，Logic，&sect；11。

[4]"Forthoughamaninafevershouldfromsugarhaveabittertaste，whichatanothertimewouldproduceasweetone，yettheideaofbitterinthatman’smindwouldbeasdistinctasifhehadtastedonlygall。"(Locke’sEssay，bk。II。chap。XI。&sect；3。Readthewholesection！)

[5]Blackroundthings，squarewhitethings，percontra，Naturegivesusfreelyenough。Butthecombinationswhichsherefusestorealizemayexistasdistinctly，intheshapeofpostulates，asthosewhichshegivesmayexistintheshapeofpositiveimages，inourmind。Asamatteroffact，shemayrealizeawarmcoldthingwhenevertwopointsoftheskin，soneartogetherasnottobelocallydistinguished，aretouched，theonewithawarm，theotherwithacold，pieceofmetal。Thewarmthandthecoldarethenoftenfeltasifinthesameobjectiveplace。Undersimilarconditionstwoobjects，onesharpandtheotherblunt，mayfeellikeonesharpbluntthing。Thesamespacemayappearoftwocolorsif，byopticalartifice，oneofthecolorsismadetoappearasifseenthroughtheother-Whetheranytwoattributeswhatevershallbecompatibleornot，inthesenseofappearingornottooccupythesameplaceandmoment，dependssimplyondefactopeculiaritiesofnaturalbodiesofoursense-organs。Logically，anyonecombinationofqualitiesistothefullasconceivableasanyother，andhasasdistinctameaningforthought。Whatnecessitatesthisremarkistheconfusiondeliberatelykeptupbycertainauthors(e。g。，Spencer，Psychology，&sect；&sect；426-7)betweentheinconceivableandthenot-distinctly-imaginable。

Howdoweknowwhichthingswecannotimagineunlessbyfirstconceivingthem，meaningthemandnototherthings？

[6]Argumentsseldommakeconvertsinmattersphilosophical；

andsomereaders，Iknow，whofindthattheyconceiveacertainmatterdifferentlyfromwhattheydid，willstillprefersayingtheyhavetwodifferenteditionsofthesameconception，oneevolvedfromtheother，tosayingtheyhavetwodifferentconceptionsofthesamething。Itdepends，afterall，onhowwedefineconception。Weourselvesdefineditasthefunctionbywhichastateofmindmeanstothinkthesamewhereofitthoughtonaformeroccasion。Twostatesofmindwillaccordinglybetwoeditionsofthesameconceptionjustsofaraseitherdoesmeantothinkwhattheotherthought；butnofarther。Ifeithermeantothinkwhattheotherdidnotthink，itisadifferentconceptionfromtheother。Andifeithermeantothinkallthattheotherthought，andmore，itisadifferentconception，sofarasthemoregoes。Inthislastcaseonestateofmindhastwoconceptualfunctions。Eachthoughtdecides，byitsownauthority，which，outofalltheconceptivefunctionsopentoit，itshallnowrenew；withwhichotherthoughtitshallidentifyitselfasaconceiver，andjusthowfar。"ThesameAwhichIoncemeant，"itsays，"Ishallnowmeanagain，andmeanitwithCasitspredicate(orwhatnot)insteadofB，asbefore。"Inallthis，therefore，thereisabsolutelynochanging，butonlyuncouplingandre-couplingofconceptions。Compoundconceptionscome，asfunctionsofnewstatesofmind。Someofthesefunctionsarethesamewithpreviousones，somenot。Anychangedopinion，then，partlycontainsneweditions(absolutelyidenticalwiththeold，however)offormerconceptions，partlyabsolutelynewconceptions。Thedivisionisaperfectlyeasyonetomakeineachparticularcase。

[7]PrinciplesofHumanKnowledge，Introduction，&sect；&sect；

10，14。

[8]’Conceptualismehonteux，’Rabier，Psychologie，310。

[9]Exam。ofHamilton，p。393。Cf。alsoLogic，bk。

II。chap。v&sect；1。andbk。IV。chap。II。&sect；1。

[10]E。g。:"Theknowledgeofthingsmustmeanthatthemindfindsitselfinthem，orthat，insomeway，thedifferencebetweenthemandthemindisdissolved。"(E。Caird，PhilosophyofKant，firstedition，p。553。)

[11]Thetraditionalconceptualistdoctrineisthatanabstractmusteoipsobeauniversal。EvenmodernandindependentauthorslikeProf。Dewey(Psychology，207)obeythetradition:"Themindseizesuponsomeoneaspect，……abstractsorprescindsit。Thisveryseizureofsomeoneelementgeneralizestheoneabstracted……Attention，indrawingitforth，makesitadistinctcontentofconsciousnessandthusuniversalizesit；itisconsiderednolongerinitsparticularconnectionwiththeobject，butonitsownaccount；thatis，asanidea，orwhatitsignifiestothemind；andsignificanceisalwaysuniversal。"

[12]C。F。Reid’sIntellectualPowers，Essayv。chap。

III-Whitenessisonething，thewhitenessofthissheetofpaperanotherthing。

[13]Mr。F。H。Bradleysaystheconceptionorthe’meaning’"consistsofapartofthecontent，cutoff，fixedbythemind，andconsideredapartfromtheexistenceofthesign。Itwouldnotbecorrecttoadd，andreferredawaytoanotherrealsubject；forwherewethinkwithoutjudging，andwherewedeny，thatdescriptionwouldnotbeapplicable。"

Thisseemstobethesamedoctrineasours；theapplicationtooneortoallsubjectsoftheabstractfactconceived(i。e。itsindividualityoritsuniversality)，constitutinganewconception。Iam，however，notquitesurethatMr。Bradleysteadilymaintainsthisground。Cf。thefirstchapterofhisPrinciplesofLogic。ThedoctrineIdefendisstoutlyupheldinRosmini’sPhilosophicalSystem，IntroductionbyThomasDavidson，p。43

(London，1882)。

[14]LecturesonGreekPhilosophy，pp。33-39。

[15]Analysis，chap。VIII。

[16]PrinciplesofHumanKnowledge，Introduction，&sect；&sect；11，12。

[17]Itmayaddtotheeffectofthetexttoquoteapassagefromtheessayin’Mind，’referredtoonp。224。

"Whymaywenotsidewiththeconceptualistsinsayingthattheuniversalsenseofaworddoescorrespondtoamentalfactofsomekind，butatthesametime，agreeingwiththenominaliststhatallmentalfactsaremodificationsofsubjectivesensibility，whymaywenotcallthatfacta’feeling’？Manmeantformankindisinshortadifferentfeelingfrommanasamerenoise，orfrommanmeantforthatman，towit，JohnSmithalone。Notthatthedifferenceconsistssimplyinthefactthat，whentakenuniversally，thewordhasoneofMr。Galton’s’blended’imagesofmanassociatedwithit。Manypersonshaveseemedtothinkthattheseblendedor，asProf。Huxleycallsthem，’generic’imagesareequivalenttoconcepts。But，initself，ablurredthingisjustasparticularasasharpthing；andthegenericcharacterofeithersharpimageorblurredimagedependsonitsbeingfeltwithitsrepresentativefunction。Thisfunctionisthemysteriousplus，theunderstoodmeaning。Butitisnothingappliedtotheimagefromabove，nopureactofreasoninhabitingasupersensibleandsemi-supernaturalplane。Itcanbediagrammatizedascontinuouswithalltheothersegmentsofthesubjectivestream。Itisjustthatstaining，fringe，orhaloofobscurelyfeltrelationtomassesofotherimageryabouttocome，butnotyetdistinctlyinfocus，whichwehavesoabsolutelysetforth[inChapterIX]。

"Iftheimagecomeunfringed，itrevealsbutasimplequality，thing，orevent；ifitcomefringed，itmayrevealsomethingexpresslytakenuniversallyorinaschemeofrelations。Thedifferencebetweenthoughtandfeelingthusreducesitself，inthelastsubjectiveanalysis，tothepresenceorabsenceof’fringe。’Andthisinturnreducesitself，withmuchprobability，inthelastphysiologicalanalysis，totheabsenceorpresenceofsub-excitementsinotherconvolutionsofthebrainthanthosewhosedischargesunderliethemoredefinitenucleus，thesubstantiveingredient，ofthethought，-inthisinstance，thewordorimageitmayhappentoarouse。

"Thecontrastisnot，then，asthePlatonistswouldhaveit，betweencertainsubjectivefactscalledimagesandsensations，andotherscalledactsofrelatingintelligence；theformerbeingblindperishingthings，knowingnoteventheirownexistenceassuch，whilstthelattercombinethepolesinthemysterioussynthesisoftheircognitivesweep。Thecontrastisreallybetweentwoaspects，inwhichallmentalfactswithoutexceptionmaybetaken；theirstructuralaspect，asbeingsubjective，andtheirfunctionalaspect，asbeingcognitions。Intheformeraspect，thehighestaswellasthelowestisafeeling，apeculiarlytingedsegmentofthestream。Thistingeingisitssensitivebody，thewieihmzuMutheist，thewayitfeelswhilstpassing。Inthelatteraspect，thelowestmentalfactaswellasthehighestmaygraspsomebitoftruthasitscontent，eventhoughthattruthwereasrelationlessamatterasabareunlocalizedandundatedqualityofpain。Fromthecognitivepointofview，allmentalfactsareintellections。Fromthesubjectivepointofviewallarefeelings。

Onceadmitthatthepassingandevanescentareasrealpartsofthestreamasthedistinctandcomparativelyabiding；onceallowthatfringesandhalos，inarticulateperceptions，whereoftheobjectsareasyetunnamed，merenascenciesofcognition，premonitions，awarenessesofdirection，arethoughtssuigeneris，asmuchasarticulateimaginingsandpropositionsare；oncerestore，Isay，thevaguetoitspsychologicalrights，andthematterpresentsnofurtherdifficulty。

"AndthenweseethatthecurrentoppositionofFeelingtoKnowledgeisquiteafalseissue。Ifeveryfeelingisatthesametimeabitofknowledge，weoughtnolongertotalkofmentalstatesdifferingbyhavingmoreorlessofthecognitivequality；theyonlydifferinknowingmoreorless，inhavingmuchfactorlittlefactfortheirobject。Thefeelingofabroadschemeofrelationsisafeelingthatknowsmuch；thefeelingofasimplequalityisafeelingthatknowslittle。Buttheknowingitself，whetherofmuchoroflittle，hasthesameessence，andisasgoodknowingintheonecaseasintheother。Conceptandimage，thusdiscriminatedthroughtheirobjects，areconsubstantialintheirinwardnature，asmodesoffeeling。

Theone，asparticular，willnolongerbeheldtobearelativelybasesortofentity，tobetakenasamatterofcourse，whilsttheother，asuniversal，iscelebratedasasortofstandingmiracle，tobeadoredbutnotexplained。Bothconceptandimage，qu&acirc；subjective，aresingularandparticular。Botharemomentsofthestream，whichcomeandinaninstantarenomore。Theworduniversalityhasnomeaningasappliedtotheirpsychicbodyorstructure，whichisalwaysfinite。Itonlyhasameaningwhenappliedtotheiruse，import，orreferencetothekindofobjecttheymayreveal。Therepresentation，assuch，oftheuniversalobjectisasparticularasthatofanobjectaboutwhichweknowsolittlethattheinterjection’Ha！’isallitcanevokefromusinthewayofspeech。

Bothshouldbeweighedinthesamescales，andhavethesamemeasuremetedouttothem，whetherofworshiporofcontempt。"(Mind，IX。pp。18-19。)

[18]Hodgson，TimeandSpace，p。404。

[19]ComparetheadmirablepassageinHodgson’sTimeandSpace，p。310。

[20]PhilosophyofReflection，I。273-308。

ClassicsintheHistoryofPsychology——James(1890)Chapter15ThePrinciplesofPsychologyWilliamJames(1890)

CHAPTERXV。[1]THEPERCEPTIONOFTIME。

InthenexttwochaptersIshalldealwithwhatissometimescalledinternalperception，ortheperceptionoftime，andofeventsasoccupyingadatetherein，especiallywhenthedateisapastone，inwhichcasetheperceptioninquestiongoesbythenameofmemory。Torememberathingaspast，itisnecessarythatthenotionof’past’shouldbeoneofour’ideas。’WeshallseeinthechapteronMemorythatmanythingscometobethoughtbyusaspast，notbecauseofanyintrinsicqualityoftheirown，butratherbecausetheyareassociatedwithotherthingswhichforussignifypastness。Buthowdothesethingsgettheirpastness？Whatistheoriginalofourexperienceofpastness，fromwhencewegetthemeaningoftheterm？Itisthisquestionwhichthereaderisinvitedtoconsiderinthepresentchapter。Weshallseethatwehaveaconstantfeelingsuigenerisofpastness，towhicheveryoneofourexperiencesinturnfallsaprey。Tothinkathingaspastistothinkitamongsttheobjectsorinthedirectionoftheobjectswhichatthepresentmomentappearaffectedbythisquality。Thisistheoriginalofournotionofpasttime，uponwhichmemoryandhistorybuildtheirsystems。

Andinthischapterweshallconsiderthisimmediatesenseoftimealone。

Iftheconstitutionofconsciousnesswerethatofastringofbead-likesensationsandimages，allseparate，"wenevercouldhaveanyknowledgeexceptthatofthepresentinstant。

Themomenteachofoursensationsceaseditwouldbegoneforever；andweshouldbeasifwehadneverbeen……Weshouldbewholly[p。606]

incapableofacquiringexperience……Evenifourideaswereassociatedintrains，butonlyastheyareinimagination，weshouldstillbewithoutthecapacityofacquiringknowledge。Oneidea，uponthissupposition，wouldfollowanother。Butthatwouldbeall。Eachofoursuccessivestatesofconsciousness，themomentitceased，wouldbegoneforever。Eachofthosemomentarystateswouldbeourwholebeing。"[2]

Wemight，nevertheless，underthesecircumstances，actinarationalway，providedthemechanismwhichproducedourtrainsofimagesproducedtheminarationalorder。Weshouldmakeappropriatespeeches，thoughunawareofanywordexcepttheonejustonourlips；weshoulddecideupontherightpolicywithouteveraglimpseofthetotalgroundsofourchoice。

Ourconsciousnesswouldbelikeaglow-wormspark，illuminatingthepointitimmediatelycovered，butleavingallbeyondintotaldarkness。Whetheraveryhighlydevelopedpracticallifebepossibleundersuchconditionsastheseismorethandoubtful；itis，however，conceivable。

Imakethefancifulhypothesismerelytosetoffourrealnaturebythecontrast。Ourfeelingsarenotthuscontracted，andourconsciousnessnevershrinkstothedimensionsofaglow-wormspark。Theknowledgeofsomeotherpartofthestream，pastorfuture，nearorremote，isalwaysmixedinwithourknowledgeofthepresentthing。

Asimplesensation，asweshallhereaftersee，isanabstraction，andallourconcretestatesofmindarerepresentationsofobjectswithsomeamountofcomplexity。Partofthecomplexityistheechooftheobjectsjustpast，and，inalessdegree，perhaps，theforetasteofthosejusttoarrive。Objectsfadeoutofconsciousnessslowly。IfthepresentthoughtisofABCDEFG，thenextonewillbeofBCDEFGH，andtheoneafterthatofCDEFGHI——thelingeringsofthepastdroppingsuccessivelyaway，andtheincomingsofthefuturemakinguptheloss。Theselingeringsofoldobjects，theseincomingsofnew，arethegermsofmemoryandexpectation，theretrospectiveandtheprospectivesenseoftime。Theygivethatcontinuityto[p。607]consciousnesswithoutwhichitcouldnotbecalledastream。[3][p。608]THESENSIBLEPRESENTHASDURATION。

Letanyonetry，Iwillnotsaytoarrest，buttonoticeorattendto，thepresentmomentoftime。Oneofthemostbafflingexperiencesoccurs。Whereisit，thispresent？Ithasmeltedinourgrasp，flederewecouldtouchit，goneintheinstantofbecoming。Asapoet，quotedbyMr。Hodgson，says，"Lemomento&ugrave；jeparleestd&eacute；j&agrave；loindemoi，"

anditisonlyasenteringintothelivingandmovingorganizationofamuchwidertractoftimethatthestrictpresentisapprehendedatall。

Itis，infact，analtogetheridealabstraction，notonlyneverrealizedinsense，butprobablyneverevenconceivedofbythoseunaccustomedtophilosophicmeditation。Reflectionleadsustotheconclusion[p。609]

thatitmustexist，butthatitdoesexistcanneverbeafactofourimmediateexperience。TheonlyfactofourimmediateexperienceiswhatMr。E。R。Clayhaswellcalled’thespeciouspresent。’Hiswordsdeservetobequotedinfull:[4]

"Therelationofexperiencetotimehasnotbeenprofoundlystudied。

Itsobjectsaregivenasbeingofthepresent，butthepartoftimereferredtobythedatumisaverydifferentthingfromtheconterminousofthepastandfuturewhichphilosophydenotesbythenamePresent。Thepresenttowhichthedatumrefersisreallyapartofthepast——arecentpast——delusivelygivenasbeingatimethatintervenesbetweenthepastandthefuture。Letitbenamedthespeciouspresent，andletthepast，thatisgivenasbeingthepast，beknownastheobviouspast。Allthenotesofabarofasongseemtothelistenertobecontainedinthepresent。

Allthechangesofplaceofameteorseemtothebeholdertobecontainedinthepresent。Attheinstantoftheterminationofsuchseries，nopartofthetimemeasuredbythemseemstobeapast。Time，then，consideredrelativelytohumanapprehension，consistsoffourparts，viz。，theobviouspast，thespeciouspresent，therealpresent，andthefuture。Omittingthespeciouspresent，itconsistsofthree……nonentities——thepast，whichdoesnotexist，thefuture，whichdoesnotexist，andtheirconterminous，thepresent；thefacultyfromwhichitproceedsliestousinthefictionofthespeciouspresent。"

Inshort，thepracticallycognizedpresentisnoknife-edge，butasaddle-back，withacertainbreadthofitsownonwhichwesitperched，andfromwhichwelookintwodirectionsintotime。Theunitofcompositionofourperceptionoftimeisaduration，withabowandastern，asitwere——arearward——andaforward-lookingend。[5]Itisonly[p。610]aspartsofthisduration-blockthattherelationofsuccessionofoneendtotheotherisperceived。

Wedonotfirstfeeloneendandthenfeeltheotherafterit，andfromtheperceptionofthesuccessioninferanintervaloftimebetween，butweseemtofeeltheintervaloftimeasawhole，withitstwoendsembeddedinit。Theexperienceisfromtheoutsetasyntheticdatum，notasimpleone；andtosensibleperceptionitselementsareinseparable，althoughattentionlookingbackmayeasilydecomposetheexperience，anddistinguishitsbeginningfromitsend。

WhenwecometostudytheperceptionofSpace，weshallfinditquiteanalogoustotimeinthisregard。Dateintimecorrespondstopositioninspace；andalthoughwenowmentallyconstructlargespacesbymentallyimaginingremoterandremoterpositions，justaswenowconstructgreatdurationsbymentallyprolongingaseriesofsuccessivedates，yettheoriginalexperienceofbothspaceandtimeisalwaysofsomethingalreadygivenasaunit，insideofwhichattentionafterwarddiscriminatespartsinrelationtoeachother。Withoutthepartsalreadygivenasinatimeandinaspace，subsequentdiscriminationofthemcouldhardlydomorethanperceivethemasdifferentfromeachother；itwouldhavenomotiveforcallingthedifferencetemporalorderinthisinstanceandspatialpositioninthat。

Andjustasincertainexperienceswemaybeconsciousofanextensivespacefullofobjects，withoutlocatingeachofthemdistinctlytherein；so，whenmanyimpressionsfollowinexcessivelyrapidsuccessionintime，althoughwemaybedistinctlyawarethattheyoccupysomeduration，andarenotsimultaneous，wemaybequiteatalosstotellwhichcomesfirstandwhichlast；orwemayeveninverttheirrealorderinourjudgment。Incomplicatedreaction-timeexperiments，wheresignalsandmotions，andclicksoftheapparatuscomeinexceedinglyrapidorder，oneisatfirstmuchperplexedindecidingwhattheorderis，yetofthefactofitsoccupancyoftimeweareneverindoubt。[p。611]ACCURACYOFOURESTIMATEOFSHORTDURATIONS。

Wemustnowproceedtoanaccountofthefactsoftime-perceptionindetailaspreliminarytoourspeculativeconclusion。Manyofthefactsaremattersofpatientexperimentation，othersofcommonexperience。

Firstofall，wenoteamarkeddifferencebetweentheelementarysensationsofdurationandthoseofspace。Theformerhaveamuchnarrowerrange；thetime-sensemaybecalledamyopicorgan，incomparisonwiththeeye，forexample。Theeyeseesrods，acres，evenmiles，atasingleglance，andthesetotalsitcanafterwardsubdivideintoanalmostinfinitenumberofdistinctlyidentifiedparts。Theunitsofduration，ontheotherhand，whichthetime-senseisabletotakeinatasinglestroke，aregroupsofafewseconds，andwithintheseunitsveryfewsubdivisions——perhapsfortyatmost，asweshallpresentlysee——canbeclearlydiscerned。Thedurationswehavepracticallymosttodealwith——minutes，hours，anddays——havetobesymbolicallyconceived，andconstructedbymentaladdition，afterthefashionofthoseextentsofhundredsofmilesandupward，whichinthefieldofspacearebeyondtherangeofmostmen’spracticalinterestsaltogether。To’realize’aquarterofamileweneedonlylookoutofthewindowandfeelitslengthbyanactwhich，thoughitmayinpartresultfromorganizedassociations，yetseemsimmediatelyperformed。Torealizeanhour，wemustcount’now！——now！——now！——now！——’indefinitely。

Each’now’isthefeelingofaseparatebitoftime，andtheexactsumofthebitsnevermakesaveryclearimpressiononourmind。

Howmanybitscanweclearlyapprehendatonce？Veryfewiftheyarelongbits，moreiftheyareextremelyshort，mostiftheycometousincompoundgroups，eachincludingsmallerbitsofitsown。

Hearingisthesensebywhichthesubdivisionofdurationsismostsharplymade。Almostalltheexperimentalworkonthetime-sensehasbeendonebymeansofstrokesofsound。Howlongaseriesofsounds，then，canwegroupinthemindsoasnottoconfounditwithalongerorashorterseries？

[p。612]Ourspontaneoustendencyistobreakupanymonotonouslygivenseriesofsoundsintosomesortofarhythm。Weinvoluntarilyaccentuateeverysecond，orthird，orfourthbeat，orwebreaktheseriesinstillmoreintricateways。Wheneverwethusgrasptheimpressionsinrhythmicform，wecanidentifyalongerstringofthemwithoutconfusion。

Eachvarietyofverse，forexample，hasits’law’；andtherecurrentstressesandsinkingsmakeusfeelwithpeculiarreadinessthelackofasyllableorthepresenceofonetoomuch。Diversversesmayagainbeboundtogetherintheformofastanza，andwemaythensayofanotherstanza，"Itssecondversediffersbysomuchfromthatofthefirststanza，"

whenbutforthefeltstanza-formthetwodifferingverseswouldhavecometoustooseparatelytobecomparedatall。Butthesesuperposedsystemsofrhythmsoonreachtheirlimit。Inmusic，asWundt[6]says，"whilethemeasuremayeasilycontain12changesofintensityofsound(asin12/8

time)，therhythmicalgroupmayembrace6measures，andtheperiodconsistof4，exceptionallyof5

[8？]groups。"

WundtandhispupilDietzehavebothtriedtodetermineexperimentallythemaximalextentofourimmediatedistinctconsciousnessforsuccessiveimpressions。

Wundtfound[7]thattwelveimpressionscouldbedistinguishedclearlyasaunitedcluster，providedtheywerecaughtinacertainrhythmbythemind，andsucceededeachotheratintervalsnotsmallerthan0。3andnotlargerthan0。5ofasecond。Thismakesthetotaltimedistinctlyapprehendedtobeequaltofrom3。6to6seconds。

Dietze[8]giveslargerfigures。Themostfavorableintervalsforclearlycatchingthestrokeswerewhentheycameatfrom0。3secondto0。18secondapart。Fortystrokesmightthenberememberedasawhole，andidentifiedwithouterrorwhenrepeated，providedthemindgraspedtheminfivesub-groupsofeight，orineightsub-groupsoffivestrokeseach。Whennogroupingofthestrokesbeyondmakingcouplesof[p。613]thembytheattentionwasallowed——andpracticallyitwasfoundimpossiblenottogrouptheminatleastthissimplestofallways——16wasthelargestnumberthatcouldbeclearlyapprehendedasawhole。[9]Thiswouldmake40times0。3

second，or12seconds，tobethemaximumfilleddurationofwhichwecanbebothdistinctlyandimmediatelyaware。

Themaximumunfilled，orvacantduration，seemstoliewithinthesameobjectiverange。EstelandMehner，alsoworkinginWundt’slaboratory，foundittovaryfrom5or6to12seconds，andperhapsmore。Thedifferencesseemedduetopracticeratherthantoidiosyncrasy。[10]

Thesefiguresmayberoughlytakentostandforthemostimportantpartofwhat，withMr。Clay，wecalled，afewpagesback，thespeciouspresent。

Thespeciouspresenthas，inaddition，avaguelyvanishingbackwardandforwardfringe；butitsnucleusisprobablythedozensecondsorlessthathavejustelapsed。

Ifthesearethemaximum，what，then，istheminimumamountofdurationwhichwecandistinctlyfeel？

ThesmallestfigureexperimentallyascertainedwasbyExner，whodistinctlyheardthedoublenessoftwosuccessiveclicksofaSavart’swheel，andoftwosuccessivesnaps[p。614]ofanelectricspark，whentheirintervalwasmadeassmallasabout1/500ofasecond。[11]

Withtheeye，perceptionislessdelicate。Twosparks，madetofallbesideeachotherinrapidsuccessiononthecentreoftheretina，ceasedtoberecognizedassuccessivebyExnerwhentheirintervalfellbelow0。044"。[12]

Where，ashere，thesucceedingimpressionsareonlytwoinnumber，wecaneasiestperceivetheintervalbetweenthem。PresidentHall，whoexperimentedwithamodifiedSavart’swheel，whichgaveclicksinvaryingnumberandatvaryingintervals，says:[13]

"Inorderthattheirdiscontinuitymaybeclearlyperceived，fouroreventhreeclicksorbeatsmustbefartherapartthantwoneedtobe。Whentwoareeasilydistinguished，threeorfourseparatedbythesameinterval……areoftenconfidentlypronouncedtobetwoorthreerespectively。

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