TheScopeofPsychologyPsychologyistheScienceofMentalLife,bothofitsphenomenaandoftheirconditions。Thephenomenaaresuchthingsaswecallfeelings,desires,cognitions,reasonings,decisions,andthelike;and,superficiallyconsidered,theirvarietyandcomplexityissuchastoleaveachaoticimpressionontheobserver。Themostnaturalandconsequentlytheearliestwayofunifyingthematerialwas,first,toclassifyitaswellasmightbe,and,secondly,toaffiliatethediversementalmodesthusfound,uponasimpleentity,thepersonalSoul,ofwhichtheyaretakentobesomanyfacultativemanifestations。Now,forinstance,theSoulmanifestsitsfacultyofMemory,nowofReasoning,nowofVolition,oragainitsImaginationoritsAppetite。Thisistheorthodox’spiritualistic’
theoryofscholasticismandofcommon-sense。Anotherandalessobviouswayofunifyingthechaosistoseekcommonelementsinthediversmentalfactsratherthanacommonagentbehindthem,andtoexplainthemconstructivelybythevariousformsofarrangementoftheseelements,asoneexplainshousesbystonesandbricks。The’associationist’schoolsofHerbartinGermany,andofHume,theMillsandBaininBritain,havethusconstructedapsychologywithoutasoulbytakingdiscrete’ideas,’faintorvivid,andshowinghow,bytheircohesions,repulsions,andforms[p。2]ofsuccession,suchthingsasreminiscences,perceptions,emotions,volitions,passions,theories,andalltheotherfurnishingsofanindividual’smindmaybeengendered。TheverySelforegooftheindividualcomesinthiswaytobeviewednolongerasthepre-existingsourceoftherepresentations,butratherastheirlastandmostcomplicatedfruit。
Now,ifwestriverigorouslytosimplifythephenomenaineitheroftheseways,wesoonbecomeawareofinadequaciesinourmethod。Anyparticularcognition,forexample,orrecollection,isaccountedforonthesoul-theorybybeingreferredtothespiritualfacultiesofCognitionorofMemory。Thesefacultiesthemselvesarethoughtofasabsolutepropertiesofthesoul;thatis,totakethecaseofmemory,noreasonisgivenwhyweshouldrememberafactasithappened,exceptthatsotorememberitconstitutestheessenceofourRecollectivePower。
Wemay,asspiritualists,trytoexplainourmemory’sfailuresandblundersbysecondarycauses。Butitssuccessescaninvokenofactorssavetheexistenceofcertainobjectivethingstoberememberedontheonehand,andofourfacultyofmemoryontheother。When,forinstance,Irecallmygraduation-day,anddragallitsincidentsandemotionsupfromdeath’sdatelessnight,nomechanicalcausecanexplainthisprocess,norcananyanalysisreduceittolowertermsormakeitsnatureseemotherthananultimatedatum,which,whetherwerebelornotatitsmysteriousness,mustsimplybetakenforgrantedifwearetopsychologizeatall。Howevertheassociationistmayrepresentthepresentideasasthrongingandarrangingthemselves,still,thespiritualistinsists,hehasintheendtoadmitthatsomething,beitbrain,beit’ideas,’beit’association,’knowspasttimeaspast,andfillsitoutwiththisorthatevent。Andwhenthespiritualistcallsmemoryan’irreduciblefaculty,’
hesaysnomorethanthisadmissionoftheassociationistalreadygrants。
Andyettheadmissionisfarfrombeingasatisfactorysimplificationoftheconcretefacts。Forwhyshouldthisabsolutegod-givenFacultyretainsomuchbettertheeventsofyesterdaythanthoseoflastyear,and,bestofall,those[p。3]ofanhourago?
Why,again,inoldageshoulditsgraspofchildhood’seventsseemfirmest?Whyshouldillnessandexhaustionenfeebleit?Whyshouldrepeatinganexperiencestrengthenourrecollectionofit?Whyshoulddrugs,fevers,asphyxia,andexcitementresuscitatethingslongsinceforgotten?Ifwecontentourselveswithmerelyaffirmingthatthefacultyofmemoryissopeculiarlyconstitutedbynatureastoexhibitjusttheseoddities,weseemlittlethebetterforhavinginvokedit,forourexplanationbecomesascomplicatedasthatofthecrudefactswithwhichwestarted。Moreoverthereissomethinggrotesqueandirrationalinthesuppositionthatthesoulisequippedwithelementarypowersofsuchaningeniouslyintricatesort。Whyshouldourmemoryclingmoreeasilytothenearthantheremote?Whyshoulditloseitsgraspofpropersoonerthanofabstractnames?Suchpeculiaritiesseemquitefantastic;andmight,foraughtwecanseeapriori,bethepreciseoppositesofwhattheyare。Evidently,then,thefacultydoesnotexistabsolutely,butworksunderconditions;
andthequestoftheconditionsbecomesthepsychologist’smostinterestingtask。
Howeverfirmlyhemayholdtothesoulandherrememberingfaculty,hemustacknowledgethatsheneverexertsthelatterwithoutacue,andthatsomethingmustalwaysprecedeandremindusofwhateverwearetorecollect。"Anidea!"saystheassociationist,"anideaassociatedwiththerememberedthing;andthisexplainsalsowhythingsrepeatedlymetwitharemoreeasilyrecollected,fortheirassociatesonthevariousoccasionsfurnishsomanydistinctavenuesofrecall。"Butthisdoesnotexplaintheeffectsoffever,exhaustion,hypnotism,oldage,andthelike。Andingeneral,thepureassociationist’saccountofourmentallifeisalmostasbewilderingasthatofthepurespiritualist。Thismultitudeofideas,existingabsolutely,yetclingingtogether,andweavinganendlesscarpetofthemselves,likedominoesinceaselesschange,orthebitsofglassinakaleidoscope,-whencedotheygettheirfantasticlawsofclinging,andwhydotheyclinginjusttheshapestheydo?
Forthistheassociationistmustintroducetheorderofexperienceintheouterworld。Thedanceoftheideasis[p。4]acopy,somewhatmutilatedandaltered,oftheorderofphenomena。Buttheslightestreflectionshowsthatphenomenahaveabsolutelynopowertoinfluenceourideasuntiltheyhavefirstimpressedoursensesandourbrain。Thebareexistenceofapastfactisnogroundforourrememberingit。Unlesswehaveseenit,orsomehowundergoneit,weshallneverknowofitshavingbeen。Theexperiencesofthebodyarethusoneoftheconditionsofthefacultyofmemorybeingwhatitis。Andaverysmallamountofreflectiononfactsshowsthatonepartofthebody,namely,thebrain,isthepartwhoseexperiencesaredirectlyconcerned。Ifthenervouscommunicationbecutoffbetweenthebrainandotherparts,theexperiencesofthoseotherpartsarenon-existentforthemind。Theeyeisblind,theeardeaf,thehandinsensibleandmotionless。Andconversely,ifthebrainbeinjured,consciousnessisabolishedoraltered,evenalthougheveryotherorganinthebodybereadytoplayitsnormalpart。Ablowonthehead,asuddensubtractionofblood,thepressureofanapoplectichemorrhage,mayhavethefirsteffect;whilstaveryfewouncesofalcoholorgrainsofopiumorhasheesh,orawhiffofchloroformornitrousoxidegas,aresuretohavethesecond。Thedeliriumoffever,thealteredselfofinsanity,areallduetoforeignmatterscirculatingthroughthebrain,ortopathologicalchangesinthatorgan’ssubstance。ThefactthatthebrainistheoneimmediatebodilyconditionofthementaloperationsisindeedsouniversallyadmittednowadaysthatIneedspendnomoretimeinillustratingit,butwillsimplypostulateitandpasson。Thewholeremainderofthebookwillbemoreorlessofaproofthatthepostulatewascorrect。
Bodilyexperiences,therefore,andmoreparticularlybrain-experiences,musttakeaplaceamongstthoseconditionsofthementallifeofwhichPsychologyneedtakeaccount。Thespiritualistandtheassociationistmustbothbe’cerebralists,’totheextentatleastofadmittingthatcertainpeculiaritiesinthewayofworkingoftheirownfavoriteprinciplesareexplicableonlybythefactthatthebrainlawsareacodeterminantoftheresult。
[p。5]Ourfirstconclusion,then,isthatacertainamountofbrain-physiologymustbepresupposedorincludedinPsychology[1]。
Instillanotherwaythepsychologistisforcedtobesomethingofanerve-physiologist。Mentalphenomenaarenotonlyconditionedaparteantebybodilyprocesses;buttheyleadtothemapartepost。Thattheyleadtoactsisofcoursethemostfamiliaroftruths,butIdonotmerelymeanactsinthesenseofvoluntaryanddeliberatemuscularperformances。Mentalstatesoccasionalsochangesinthecalibreofblood-vessels,oralterationintheheartbeats,orprocessesmoresubtlestill,inglandsandviscera。Ifthesearetakenintoaccount,aswellasactswhichfollowatsomeremoteperiodbecausethementalstatewasoncethere,itwillbesafetolaydownthegenerallawthatnomentalmodificationeveroccurswhichisnotaccompaniedorfollowedbyabodilychange。Theideasandfeelings,e。g。,whichthesepresentprintedcharactersexciteinthereader’smindnotonlyoccasionmovementsofhiseyesandnascentmovementsofarticulationinhim,butwillsomedaymakehimspeak,ortakesidesinadiscussion,orgiveadvice,orchooseabooktoread,differentlyfromwhatwouldhavebeenthecasehadtheyneverimpressedhisretina。Ourpsychologymustthereforetakeaccountnotonlyoftheconditionsantecedenttomentalstates,butoftheirresultantconsequencesaswell。
Butactionsoriginallypromptedbyconsciousintelligencemaygrowsoautomaticbydintofhabitastobeapparentlyunconsciouslyperformed。Standing,walking,buttoningandunbuttoning,piano-playing,talking,evensayingone’sprayers,maybedonewhenthemindisabsorbedinotherthings。Theperformancesofanimalinstinctseemsemi-automatic,andthereflexactsofself-preservationcertainlyareso。Yettheyresembleintelligentactsinbringingaboutthesameendsatwhichtheanimals’consciousness,onotheroccasions,deliberatelyaims。[p。6]Shallthestudyofsuchmachine-likeyetpurposiveactsasthesebeincludedinPsychology?
Theboundary-lineofthementaliscertainlyvague。Itisbetternottobepedantic,buttoletthesciencebeasvagueasitssubject,andincludesuchphenomenaastheseifbysodoingwecanthrowanylightonthemainbusinessinhand。Itwillerelongbeseen,Itrust,thatwecan;andthatwegainmuchmorebyabroadthanbyanarrowconceptionofoursubject。Atacertainstageinthedevelopmentofeveryscienceadegreeofvaguenessiswhatbestconsistswithfertility。
Onthewhole,fewrecentformulashavedonemorerealserviceofaroughsortinpsychologythantheSpencerianonethattheessenceofmentallifeandofbodilylifeareone,namely,’theadjustmentofinnertoouterrelations。’Suchaformulaisvaguenessincarnate;butbecauseittakesintoaccountthefactthatmindsinhabitenvironmentswhichactonthemandonwhichtheyinturnreact;because,inshort,ittakesmindinthemidstofallitsconcreterelations,itisimmenselymorefertilethantheold-fashioned’rationalpsychology,’whichtreatedthesoulasadetachedexistent,sufficientuntoitself,andassumedtoconsideronlyitsnatureandproperties。Ishallthereforefeelfreetomakeanysalliesintozoologyorintopurenerve-physiologywhichmayseeminstructiveforourpurposes,butotherwiseshallleavethosesciencestothephysiologists。
Canwestatemoredistinctlystillthemannerinwhichthementallifeseemstointervenebetweenimpressionsmadefromwithoutuponthebody,andreactionsofthebodyupontheouterworldagain?Letuslookatafewfacts。
Ifsomeironfilingsbesprinkledonatableandamagnetbroughtnearthem,theywillflythroughtheairforacertaindistanceandsticktoitssurface。Asavageseeingthephenomenonexplainsitastheresultofanattractionorlovebetweenthemagnetandthefilings。Butletacardcoverthepolesofthemagnet,andthefilingswillpressforeveragainstitssurfacewithoutitseveroccurringtothemtopassarounditssidesandthuscomeinto[p。7]moredirectcontactwiththeobjectoftheirlove。Blowbubblesthroughatubeintothebottomofapailofwater,theywillrisetothesurfaceandminglewiththeair。
Theiractionmayagainbepoeticallyinterpretedasduetoalongingtorecombinewiththemother-atmosphereabovethesurface。Butifyouinvertajarfullofwateroverthepail,theywillriseandremainlodgedbeneathitsbottom,shutinfromtheouterair,althoughaslightdeflectionfromtheircourseattheoutset,orare-descenttowardstherimofthejar,whentheyfoundtheirupwardcourseimpeded,couldeasilyhavesetthemfree。
Ifnowwepassfromsuchactionsasthesetothoseoflivingthings,wenoticeastrikingdifference。RomeowantsJulietasthefilingswantthemagnet;andifnoobstaclesintervenehemovestowardsherbyasstraightalineasthey。ButRomeoandJuliet,ifawallbebuiltbetweenthem,donotremainidioticallypressingtheirfacesagainstitsoppositesideslikethemagnetandthefilingswiththecard。Romeosoonfindsacircuitousway,byscalingthewallorotherwise,oftouchingJuliet’slipsdirectly。Withthefilingsthepathisfixed;
whetheritreachestheenddependsonaccidents。Withtheloveritistheendwhichisfixed,thepathmaybemodifiedindefinitely。
Supposealivingfroginthepositioninwhichweplacedourbubblesofair,namely,atthebottomofajarofwater。Thewantofbreathwillsoonmakehimalsolongtorejointhemother-atmosphere,andhewilltaketheshortestpathtohisendbyswimmingstraightupwards。
Butifajarfullofwaterbeinvertedoverhim,hewillnot,likethebubbles,perpetuallypresshisnoseagainstitsunyieldingroof,butwillrestlesslyexploretheneighborhooduntilbyre-descendingagainhehasdiscoveredapatharounditsbrimtothegoalofhisdesires。Againthefixedend,thevaryingmeans!
Suchcontrastsbetweenlivingandinanimateperformancesendbyleadingmentodenythatinthephysicalworldfinalpurposesexistatall。Lovesanddesiresareto-daynolongerimputedtoparticlesofironorofair。Noonesupposesnowthattheendofanyactivitywhichtheymaydisplayisanidealpurposepresidingoverthe[p。8]activityfromitsoutsetandsolicitingordrawingitintobeingbyasortofvisafronte。Theend,onthecontrary,isdeemedamerepassiveresult,pushedintobeingatergo,havinghad,sotospeak,novoiceinitsownproduction。Alter,thepre-existingconditions,andwithinorganicmaterialsyoubringfortheachtimeadifferentapparentend。Butwithintelligentagents,alteringtheconditionschangestheactivitydisplayed,butnottheendreached;forheretheideaoftheyetunrealizedendco-operateswiththeconditionstodeterminewhattheactivitiesshallbe。
ThePursuanceoffutureendsandthechoiceofmeansfortheirattainment,arethusthemarkandcriterionofthepresenceofmentalityinaphenomenon。Weallusethistesttodiscriminatebetweenanintelligentandamechanicalperformance。
Weimputenomentalitytosticksandstones,becausetheyneverseemtomoveforthesakeofanything,butalwayswhenpushed,andthenindifferentlyandwithnosignofchoice。Soweunhesitatinglycallthemsenseless。
Justsoweformourdecisionuponthedeepestofallphilosophicproblems:IstheKosmosanexpressionofintelligencerationalinitsinwardnature,orabruteexternalfactpureandsimple?Ifwefindourselves,incontemplatingit,unabletobanishtheimpressionthatitisarealmoffinalpurposes,thatitexistsforthesakeofsomething,weplaceintelligenceattileheartofitandhaveareligion。If,onthecontrary,insurveyingitsirremediableflux,wecanthinkofthepresentonlyassomuchmeremechanicalsproutingfromthepast,occurringwithnoreferencetothefuture,weareatheistsandmaterialists。
Inthelengthydiscussionswhichpsychologistshavecarriedonabouttheamountofintelligencedisplayedbylowermammals,ortheamountofconsciousnessinvolvedinthefunctionsofthenerve-centresofreptiles,thesametesthasalwaysbeenapplied:
Isthecharacteroftheactionssuchthatwemustbelievethemtobeperformedforthesakeoftheirresult?Theresultinquestion,asweshallhereafterabundantlysee,isasaruleausefulone,-theanimalis,onthewhole,saferunderthecircumstancesforbringingitforth。Sofartheactionhasateleologicalcharacter;[p。9]butsuchmereoutwardteleologyasthismightstillbetheblindresultofvisatergo。Thegrowthandmovementsofplants,theprocessesofdevelopment,digestion,secretion,etc。,inanimals,supplyinnumerableinstancesofperformancesusefultotheindividualwhichmayneverthelessbe,andbymostofusaresupposedtobe,producedbyautomaticmechanism。Thephysiologistdoesnotconfidentlyassertconsciousintelligenceinthefrog’sspinalcorduntilhehasshownthattheusefulresultwhichthenervousmachinerybringsforthunderagivenirritationremainsthesamewhenthemachineryisaltered。If,totakethestock-instance,therightkneeofaheadlessfrogbeirritatedwithacid,therightfootwillwipeitoff。When,however,thisfootisamputated,theanimalwilloftenraisetheleftfoottothespotandwipetheoffendingmaterialaway。
PflugerandLewesreasonfromsuchfactsinthefollowingway:Ifthefirstreactionweretheresultofmeremachinery,theysay;ifthatirritatedportionoftheskindischargedtherightlegasatriggerdischargesitsownbarrelofashotgun;thenamputatingtherightfootwouldindeedfrustratethewiping,butwouldnotmaketheleftlegmove。Itwouldsimplyresultintherightstumpmovingthroughtheemptyair(whichisinfactthephenomenonsometimesobserved)。
Therighttriggermakesnoefforttodischargetheleftbarreliftherightonebeunloaded;nordoesanelectricalmachineevergetrestlessbecauseitcanonlyemitsparks,andnothempillow-caseslikeasewing-machine。
If,onthecontrary,therightlegoriginallymovedforthepurposeofwipingtheacid,thennothingismorenaturalthanthat,whentheeasiestmeansofeffectingthatpurposeprovefruitless,othermeansshouldbetried。Everyfailuremustkeeptheanimalinastateofdisappointmentwhichwillleadtoallsortsofnewtrialsanddevices;andtranquillitywillnotensuetilloneofthese,byahappystroke,achievesthewished-forend。
InasimilarwayGoltzascribesintelligencetothefrog’sopticlobesandcerebellum。Wealludedabovetothemannerinwhichasoundfrogimprisonedinwaterwilldiscoveranoutlettotheatmosphere。Goltzfoundthatfrogsdeprivedoftheircerebralhemisphereswouldoftenexhibit[p。10]alikeingenuity。
Suchafrog,afterrisingfromthebottomandfindinghisfartherupwardprogresscheckedbytheglassbellwhichhasbeeninvertedoverhim,willnotpersistinbuttinghisnoseagainsttheobstacleuntildeadofsuffocation,butwilloftenre-descendandemergefromunderitsrimasif,notadefinitemechanicalpropulsionupwards,butratheraconsciousdesiretoreachtheairbyhookorcrookwerethemain-springofhisactivity。Goltzconcludedfromthisthatthehemispheresarenottheseatofintellectualpowerinfrogs。Hemadethesameinferencefromobservingthatabrainlessfrogwillturnoverfromhisbacktohisbellywhenoneofhislegsissewedup,althoughthemovementsrequiredarethenverydifferentfromthoseexcitedundernormalcircumstancesbythesameannoyingposition。Theyseemdetermined,consequently,notmerelybytheantecedentirritant,butbythefinalend,-thoughtheirritantofcourseiswhatmakestheenddesired。
AnotherbrilliantGermanauthor,Liebmann[2],arguesagainstthebrain’smechanismaccountingformentalaction,byverysimilarconsiderations。Amachineassuch,hesays,willbringforthrightresultswhenitisingoodorder,andwrongresultsifoutofrepair。Butbothkindsofresultflowwithequallyfatalnecessityfromtheirconditions。Wecannotsupposetheclock-workwhosestructurefatallydeterminesittoacertainrateofspeed,noticingthatthisspeedistooslowortoofastandvainlytryingtocorrectit。Itsconscience,ifithaveany,shouldbeasgoodasthatofthebestchronometer,forbothalikeobeyequallywellthesameeternalmechanicallaws-lawsfrombehind。Butifthebrainbeoutoforderandthemansays"Twicefouraretwo,"insteadof"Twicefourareeight,"
orelse"Imustgotothecoaltobuythewharf,"insteadof"Imustgotothewharftobuythecoal,"instantlytherearisesaconsciousnessoferror。Thewrongperformance,thoughitobeythesamemechanicallawastheright,isneverthelesscondemned,-condemnedascontradictingtheinnerlaw-thelawfrominfront,thepurposeoridealforwhichthebrainshouldact,whetheritdosoornot。
[p。11]Weneednotdiscussherewhetherthesewritersindrawingtheirconclusionhavedonejusticetoallthepremisesinvolvedinthecasestheytreatof。Wequotetheirargumentsonlytoshowhowtheyappealtotheprinciplethatnoactionsbutsuchasaredoneforanend,andshowachoiceofmeans,canbecalledindubitableexpressionsofMind。
Ishallthenadoptthisasthecriterionbywhichtocircumscribethesubject-matterofthisworksofarasactionentersintoit。Manynervousperformanceswillthereforebeunmentioned,asbeingpurelyphysiological。Norwilltheanatomyofthenervoussystemandorgansofsensebedescribedanew。ThereaderwillfindinH。N。Martin’sHumanBody,inG。T。Ladd’sPhysiologicalPsychology,andinalltheotherstandardAnatomiesandPhysiologies,amassofinformationwhichwemustregardaspreliminaryandtakeforgrantedinthepresentwork[3]。Ofthefunctionsofthecerebralhemispheres,however,sincetheydirectlysubserveconsciousness,itwillbewelltogivesomelittleaccount。Footnotes[1]Cf。GeorgeT。Ladd:ElementsofPhysiologicalPsychology(1887),pt。III,chap。
III,9,12
[2]ZurAnalysisderWirklichkeit,p。489
[3]Nothingiseasierthantofamiliarizeone’sselfwiththemammalianbrain。Getasheep’shead,asmallsaw,chisel,scalpelandforceps(allthreecanbestbehadfromasurgical-instrumentmaker),andunravelitspartseitherbytheaidofahumandissectingbook,suchasHolden’sManualofAnatomy,orbythespecificdirectionsadhocgiveninsuchbooksasFosterandLangley’sPracticalPhysiology(Macmillan)orMorrell’sComparativeAnatomy,andGuidetoDissection(Longman&;Co。)。ClassicsintheHistoryofPsychology——James(1890)Chapter5ThePrinciplesofPsychologyWilliamJames(1890)CHAPTERVTheAutomaton-TheoryIndescribingthefunctionsofthehemispheresashortwayback,weusedlanguagederivedfromboththebodilyandthementallife,sayingnowthattheanimalmadeindeterminateandunforeseeablereactions,andanonthathewasswayedbyconsiderationsoffuturegoodandevil;treatinghishemispheressometimesastheseatofmemoryandideasinthepsychicsense,andsometimestalkingofthemassimplyacomplicatedadditiontohisreflexmachinery。Thissortofvacillationinthepointofviewisafatalincidentofallordinarytalkaboutthesequestions;butImustnowsettlemyscoreswiththosereaderstowhomIalreadydroppedawordinpassing(seepage24,note)andwhohaveprobablybeendissatisfiedwithmyconducteversince。
Supposewerestrictourviewtofactsofoneandthesameplane,andletthatbethebodilyplane:cannotalltheoutwardphenomenaofintelligencestillbeexhaustivelydescribed?Thosementalimages,those’considerations,’
whereofwespoke,-presumablytheydonotarisewithoutneuralprocessesarisingsimultaneouslywiththem,andpresumablyeachconsiderationcorrespondstoaprocesssuigeneris,andunlikealltherest。Inotherwords,howevernumerousanddelicatelydifferentiatedthetrainofideasmaybe,thetrainofbrain-eventsthatrunsalongsideofitmustinbothrespectsbeexactlyitsmatch,andwemustpostulateaneuralmachinerythatoffersalivingcounterpartforeveryshading,howeverfine,ofthehistoryofitsowner’smind。Whateverdegreeofcomplicationthelattermayreach,thecomplicationofthemachinerymustbequiteasextreme,otherwiseweshouldhavetoadmitthattheremaybementaleventstowhichnobrain-eventscorrespond。[p。129]Butsuchanadmissionasthisthephysiologistisreluctanttomake。Itwouldviolateallhisbeliefs。’Nopsychosiswithoutneurosis,’
isoneformwhichtheprincipleofcontinuitytakesinhismind。
Butthisprincipleforcesthephysiologisttomakestillanotherstep。
Ifneuralactionisascomplicatedasmind;andifinthesympatheticsystemandlowerspinalcordweseewhat,sofarasweknow,isunconsciousneuralactionexecutingdeedsthattoalloutwardintentmaybecalledintelligent;
whatistheretohinderusfromsupposingthatevenwhereweknowconsciousnesstobethere,thestillmorecomplicatedneuralactionwhichwebelievetobeitsinseparablecompanionisaloneandofitselftherealagentofwhateverintelligentdeedsmayappear?"Asactionsofacertaindegreeofcomplexityarebroughtaboutbymeremechanism,whymaynotactionsofastillgreaterdegreeofcomplexitybetheresultofamorerefinedmechanism?"Theconceptionofreflexactionissurelyoneofthebestconquestsofphysiologicaltheory;whynotberadicalwithit?Whynotsaythatjustasthespinalcordisamachinewithfewreflexes,sothehemispheresareamachinewithmany,andthatthatisallthedifference?Theprincipleofcontinuitywouldpressustoacceptthisview。
Butwhatonthisviewcouldbethefunctionoftheconsciousnessitself?Mechanicalfunctionitwouldhavenone。Thesense-organswouldawakenthebrain-cells;thesewouldawakeneachotherinrationalandorderlysequence,untilthetimeforactioncame;andthenthelastbrain-vibrationwoulddischargedownwardintothemotortracts。Butthiswouldbeaquiteautonomouschainofoccurrences,andwhatevermindwentwithitwouldbethereonlyasan’epiphenomenon,’aninertspectator,asortof’foam,aura,ormelody’asMr。Hodgsonsays,whoseoppositionorwhosefurtherancewouldbealikepowerlessovertheoccurrencesthemselves。Whentalking,sometimeago,weoughtnot,accordingly,asphysiologists,tohavesaidanythingabout’considerations’asguidingtheanimal。Weoughttohavesaid’pathsleftinthehemisphericalcortexbyformercurrents,’
andnothingmore。
Nowsosimpleandattractiveisthisconceptionfromthe[p。130]consistentlyphysiologicalpointofview,thatitisquitewonderfultoseehowlateitwasstumbledoninphilosophy,andhowfewpeople,evenwhenithasbeenexplainedtothem,fullyandeasilyrealizeitsimport。Muchofthepolemicwritingagainstitisbymenwhohaveasyetfailedtotakeitintotheirimaginations。Sincethishasbeenthecase,itseemsworthwhiletodevoteafewmorewordstomakingitplausible,beforecriticisingitourselves。
ToDescartesbelongsthecreditofhavingfirstbeenboldenoughtoconceiveofacompletelyself-sufficingnervousmechanismwhichshouldbeabletoperformcomplicatedandapparentlyintelligentacts。Byasingularlyarbitraryrestriction,however,Descartesstoppedshortatman,andwhilecontendingthatinbeaststhenervousmachinerywasall,heheldthatthehigheractsofmanweretheresultoftheagencyofhisrationalsoul。
Theopinionthatbeastshavenoconsciousnessatallwasofcoursetooparadoxicaltomaintainitselflongasanythingmorethanacuriousiteminthehistoryofphilosophy。Andwithitsabandonmenttheverynotionthatthenervoussystempersemightworktheworkofintelligence,whichwasanintegral,thoughdetachablepartofthewholetheory,seemedalsotoslipoutofmen’sconception,until,inthiscentury,theelaborationofthedoctrineofreflexactionmadeitpossibleandnaturalthatitshouldagainarise。Butitwasnottill1870,Ibelieve,thatMr。Hodgsonmadethedecisivestep,bysayingthatfeelings,nomatterhowintenselytheymaybepresent,canhavenocausalefficacywhatever,andcomparingthemtothecolorslaidonthesurfaceofamosaic,ofwhichtheeventsinthenervoussystemarerepresentedbythestones。[1]Obviouslythestonesareheldinplacebyeachotherandnotbytheseveralcolorswhichtheysupport。
AboutthesametimeMr。Spalding,andalittlelaterMessrs。HuxleyandClifford,gavegreatpublicitytoanidenticaldoctrine,thoughintheircaseitwasbackedbylessrefinedmetaphysicalconsiderations。[2]
[p。131]AfewsentencesfromHuxleyandCliffordmaybesubjoinedtomakethematterentirelyclear。ProfessorHuxleysays:
"Theconsciousnessofbruteswouldappeartoberelatedtothemechanismoftheirbodysimplyasacollateralproductofitsworking,andtobeascompletelywithoutanypowerofmodifyingthatworkingasthesteam-whistlewhichaccompaniestheworkofalocomotiveengineiswithoutinfluenceonitsmachinery。Theirvolition,iftheyhaveany,isanemotionindicativeofphysicalchanges,notacauseofsuchchanges……Thesoulstandsrelatedtothebodyasthebellofaclocktotheworks,andconsciousnessanswerstothesoundwhichthebellgivesoutwhenitisstruck……ThusfarIhavestrictlyconfinedmyselftotheautomatismofbrutes……Itisquitetruethat,tothebestofmyjudgment,theargumentationwhichappliestobrutesholdsequallygoodofmen;and,therefore,thatallstatesofconsciousnessinus,asinthem,areimmediatelycausedbymolecularchangesofthebrain-substance。Itseemstomethatinmen,asinbrutes,thereisnoproofthatanystateofconsciousnessisthecauseofchangeinthemotionofthematteroftheorganism。Ifthesepositionsarewellbased,itfollowsthatourmentalconditionsaresimplythesymbolsinconsciousnessofthechangeswhichtakeplaceautomaticallyintheorganism;
andthat,totakeanextremeillustration,thefeelingwecallvolitionisnotthecauseofavoluntaryact,butthesymbolofthatstateofthebrainwhichistheimmediatecauseofthatact。Weareconsciousautomata。"
ProfessorCliffordwrites:
"Alltheevidencethatwehavegoestoshowthatthephysicalworldgetsalongentirelybyitself,accordingtopracticallyuniversalrules……Thetrainofphysicalfactsbetweenthestimulussentintotheeye,ortoanyoneofoursenses,andtheexertionwhichfollowsit,andthetrainofphysicalfactswhichgoesoninthebrain,evenwhenthereisnostimulusandnoexertion,-theseareperfectlycompletephysicaltrains,andeverystepisfullyaccountedforbymechanicalconditions……Thetwothingsareonutterlydifferentplatforms-thephysicalfactsgoalongbythemselves,andthementalfactsgoalongbythemselves。Thereisaparallelismbetweenthem,butthereisnointerferenceofonewiththeother。Again,ifanybodysaysthatthewillinfluencesmatter,thestatementisnotuntrue,butitisnonsense。Suchanassertionbelongstothecrudematerialismofthesavage。Theonly[p。132]thingwhichinfluencesmatteristhepositionofsurroundingmatterorthemotionofsurroundingmatter……Theassertionthatanotherman’svolition,afeelinginhisconsciousnessthatIcannotperceive,ispartofthetrainofphysicalfactswhichI
mayperceive,-thisisneithertruenonuntrue,butnonsense;itisacombinationofwordswhosecorrespondingideaswillnotgotogether……Sometimesoneseriesisknownbetter,andsometimestheother;sothatintellingastorywespeaksometimesofmentalandsometimesofmaterialfacts。Afeelingofchillmadeamanrun;strictlyspeaking,thenervousdisturbancewhichcoexistedwiththatfeelingofchillmadehimrun,ifwewanttotalkaboutmaterialfacts;orthefeelingofchillproducedtheformofsub-consciousnesswhichcoexistswiththemotionoflegs,ifwewanttotalkaboutmentalfacts……When,therefore,weask:’Whatisthephysicallinkbetweentheingoingmessagefromchilledskinandtheoutgoingmessagewhichmovestheleg?’andtheansweris,’Aman’swill,’wehaveasmuchrighttobeamusedasifwehadaskedourfriendwiththepicturewhatpigmentwasusedinpaintingthecannonintheforeground,andreceivedtheanswer,’Wroughtiron。’Itwillbefoundexcellentpracticeinthementaloperationsrequiredbythisdoctrinetoimagineatrain,theforepartofwhichisanengineandthreecarriageslinkedwithironcouplings,andthehindpartthreeothercarriageslinkedwithironcouplings;
thebondbetweenthetwopartsbeingmadeupoutofthesentimentsofamitysubsistingbetweenthestokerandtheguard。"
Tocomprehendcompletelytheconsequencesofthedogmasoconfidentlyenunciated,oneshouldunflinchinglyapplyittothemostcomplicatedexamples。
Themovementsofourtonguesandpens,theflashingsofoureyesinconversation,areofcourseeventsofamaterialorder,andassuchtheircausalantecedentsmustbeexclusivelymaterial。IfweknewthoroughlythenervoussystemofShakespeare,andasthoroughlyallhisenvironingconditions,weshouldbeabletoshowwhyatacertainperiodofhislifehishandcametotraceoncertainsheetsofpaperthosecrabbedlittleblackmarkswhichweforshortness’sakecallthemanuscriptofHamlet。Weshouldunderstandtherationaleofeveryerasureandalterationtherein,andweshouldunderstandallthiswithoutintheslightestdegreeacknowledgingtheexistenceofthethoughtsinShakespeare’smind。Thewordsandsentenceswouldbetaken,notassignsofanythingbeyondthemselves,butaslittleoutwardfacts,pureandsimple。Inlikemannerwemightexhaustivelywritethebiographyofthosetwohundred[p。133]pounds,moreorless,ofwarmishalbuminoidmattercalledMartinLuther,withouteverimplyingthatitfelt。
But,ontheotherhand,nothinginallthiscouldpreventusfromgivinganequallycompleteaccountofeitherLuther’sorShakespeare’sspiritualhistory,anaccountinwhicheverygleamofthoughtandemotionshouldfinditsplace。Themind-historywouldrunalongsideofthebody-historyofeachman,andeachpointintheonewouldcorrespondto,butnotreactupon,apointintheother。Sothemelodyfloatsfromtheharp-string,butneitherchecksnorquickensitsvibrations;sotheshadowrunsalongsidethepedestrian,butinnowayinfluenceshissteps。
Anotherinference,apparentlymoreparadoxicalstill,needstobemade,though,asfarasIamaware,Dr。Hodgsonistheonlywriterwhohasexplicitlydrawnit。Thatinferenceisthatfeelings,notcausingnerve-actions,cannotevencauseeachother。Toordinarycommonsense,feltpainis,assuch,notonlythecauseofoutwardtearsandcries,butalsothecauseofsuchinwardeventsassorrow,compunction,desire,orinventivethought。Sotheconsciousnessofgoodnewsisthedirectproducerofthefeelingofjoy,theawarenessofpremisesthatofthebeliefinconclusions。Butaccordingtotheautomaton-theory,eachofthefeelingsmentionedisonlythecorrelateofsomenerve-movementwhosecauselaywhollyinapreviousnerve-movement。
Thefirstnerve-movementcalledupthesecond;whateverfeelingwasattachedtothesecondconsequentlyfounditselffollowinguponthefeelingthatwasattachedtothefirst。If,forexample,goodnewswastheconsciousnesscorrelatedwiththefirstmovement,thenjoyturnedouttobethecorrelateinconsciousnessofthesecond。Butallthewhiletheitemsofthenerveseriesweretheonlyonesincausalcontinuity;theitemsoftheconsciousseries,howeverinwardlyrationaltheirsequence,weresimplyjuxtaposed。REASONSFORTHETHEORY。
The’consciousautomaton-theory,’asthisconceptionisgenerallycalled,isthusaradicalandsimpleconceptionofthemannerinwhichcertainfactsmaypossiblyoccur。But[p。134]betweenconceptionandbelief,proofoughttolie。Andwhenweask,’Whatprovesthatallthisismorethanamereconceptionofthepossible?’itisnoteasytogetasufficientreply。Ifwestartfromthefrog’sspinalcordandreasonbycontinuity,saying,asthatactssointelligently,thoughunconscious,sothehighercentres,thoughconscious,mayhavetheintelligencetheyshowquiteasmechanicallybased;weareimmediatelymetbytheexactcounter-argumentfromcontinuity,anargumentactuallyurgedbysuchwritersasPflü;gerandLewes,whichstartsfromtheactsofthehemispheres,andsays:"Astheseowetheirintelligencetotheconsciousnesswhichweknowtobethere,sotheintelligenceofthespinalcord’sactsmustreallybeduetotheinvisiblepresenceofaconsciousnesslowerindegree。"Allargumentsfromcontinuityworkintwoways,youcaneitherleveluporleveldownbytheirmeans;anditisclearthatsuchargumentsasthesecaneateachotheruptoalleternity。
Thereremainsasortofphilosophicfaith,bredlikemostfaithsfromanaestheticdemand。Mentalandphysicaleventsare,onallhands,admittedtopresentthestrongestcontrastintheentirefieldofbeing。Thechasmwhichyawnsbetweenthemislesseasilybridgedoverbythemindthananyintervalweknow。Why,then,notcallitanabsolutechasm,andsaynotonlythatthetwoworldsaredifferent,butthattheyareindependent?
Thisgivesusthecomfortofallsimpleandabsoluteformulas,anditmakeseachchainhomogeneoustoourconsideration。Whentalkingofnervoustremorsandbodilyactions,wemayfeelsecureagainstintrusionfromanirrelevantmentalworld。When,ontheotherhand,wespeakoffeelings,wemaywithequalconsistencyusetermsalwaysofonedenomination,andneverbeannoyedbywhatAristotlecalls’slippingintoanotherkind。’Thedesireonthepartofmeneducatedinlaboratoriesnottohavetheirphysicalreasoningsmixedupwithsuchincommensurablefactorsasfeelingsiscertainlyverystrong。Ihaveheardamostintelligentbiologistsay:"Itishightimeforscientificmentoprotestagainsttherecognitionofanysuchthingasconsciousnessinascientificinvestigation。"Inaword,feelingconstitutes[p。135]the’unscientific’halfofexistence,andanyonewhoenjoyscallinghimselfa’scientist’willbetoohappytopurchaseanuntrammelledhomogeneityoftermsinthestudiesofhispredilection,attheslightcostofadmittingadualismwhich,inthesamebreaththatitallowstomindanindependentstatusofbeing,banishesittoalimboofcausalinertness,fromwhencenointrusionorinterruptiononitspartneedeverbefeared。
Overandabovethisgreatpostulatethatmattersmustbekeptsimple,thereis,itmustbeconfessed,stillanotherhighlyabstractreasonfordenyingcausalefficacitytoourfeelings。Wecanformnopositiveimageofthemodusoperandiofavolitionorotherthoughtaffectingthecerebralmolecules。
"Letustrytoimagineanidea,sayoffood,producingamovement,sayofcarryingfoodtothemouth……Whatisthemethodofitsaction?
Doesitassistthedecompositionofthemoleculesofthegraymatter,ordoesitretardtheprocess,ordoesitalterthedirectioninwhichtheshocksaredistributed?Letusimaginethemoleculesofthegraymattercombinedinsuchawaythattheywillfallintosimplercombinationsontheimpactofanincidentforce。Nowsupposetheincidentforce,intheshapeofashockfromsomeothercentre,toimpingeuponthesemolecules。
Byhypothesisitwilldecomposethem,andtheywillfallintothesimplercombination。Howistheideaoffoodtopreventthisdecomposition?Manifestlyitcandosoonlybyincreasingtheforcewhichbindsthemoleculestogether。
Good!Trytoimaginetheideaofabeefsteakbindingtwomoleculestogether。
Itisimpossible。Equallyimpossibleisittoimagineasimilaridealooseningtheattractiveforcebetweentwomolecules。"[3]
ThispassagefromanexceedinglycleverwriterexpressesadmirablythedifficultytowhichIallude。Combinedwithastrongsenseofthe’chasm’
betweenthetwoworlds,andwithalivelyfaithinreflexmachinery,thesenseofthisdifficultycanhardlyfailtomakeoneturnconsciousnessoutofthedoorasasuperfluitysofarasone’sexplanationsgo。Onemaybowheroutpolitely,allowhertoremainasa’concomitant,’butoneinsiststhatmattershallholdallthepower。
"Havingthoroughlyrecognizedthefathomlessabyssthatseparatesmindfrommatter,andhavingsoblendedtheverynotionintohisvery[p。136]
naturethatthereisnochanceofhiseverforgettingitorfailingtosaturatewithitallhismeditations,thestudentofpsychologyhasnexttoappreciatetheassociationbetweenthesetwoordersofphenomena……Theyareassociatedinamannersointimatethatsomeofthegreatestthinkersconsiderthemdifferentaspectsofthesameprocess……Whentherearrangementofmoleculestakesplaceinthehigherregionsofthebrain,achangeofconsciousnesssimultaneouslyoccurs……Thechangeofconsciousnessnevertakesplacewithoutthechangeinthebrain;thechangeinthebrainnever……withoutthechangeinconsciousness。Butwhythetwooccurtogether,orwhatthelinkiswhichconnectsthem,wedonotknow,andmostauthoritiesbelievethatwenevershallandnevercanknow。Havingfirmlyandtenaciouslygraspedthesetwonotions,oftheabsoluteseparatenessofmindandmatter,andoftheinvariableconcomitanceofamentalchangewithabodilychange,thestudentwillenteronthestudyofpsychologywithhalfhisdifficultiessurmounted。"[4]
Halfhisdifficultiesignored,Ishouldprefertosay。Forthis’concomitance’
inthemidstof’absoluteseparateness’isanutterlyirrationalnotion。
Itistomymindquiteinconceivablethatconsciousnessshouldhavenothingtodowithabusinesswhichitsofaithfullyattends。Andthequestion,’Whathasittodo?’isonewhichpsychologyhasnorightto’surmount,’
foritisherplaindutytoconsiderit。Thefactisthatthewholequestionofinteractionandinfluencebetweenthingsisametaphysicalquestion,andcannotbediscussedatallbythosewhoareunwillingtogointomattersthoroughly。Itistrulyenoughhardtoimaginethe’ideaofabeefsteakbindingtwomoleculestogether;’butsinceHume’stimeithasbeenequallyhardtoimagineanythingbindingthemtogether。Thewholenotionof’binding’isamystery,thefirststeptowardsthesolutionofwhichistoclearscholasticrubbishoutoftheway。Popularsciencetalksof’forces,’’attractions’or’affinities’asbindingthemolecules;butclearscience,thoughshemayusesuchwordstoabbreviatediscourse,hasnousefortheconceptions,andissatisfiedwhenshecanexpressinsimple’laws’thebarespace-relationsofthemoleculesasfunctionsofeachotherandoftime。Tothemorecuriouslyinquiringmind,however,thissimplifiedexpressionofthebarefactsisnotenough;theremust[p。137]bea’reason’
forthem,andsomethingmust’determine’thelaws。Andwhenoneseriouslysitsdowntoconsiderwhatsortofathingonemeanswhenoneasksfora’reason,’oneisledsofarafield,sofarawayfrompopularscienceanditsscholasticism,astoseethatevensuchafactastheexistenceornon-existenceintheuniverseof’theideaofabeefsteak’maynotbewhollyindifferenttootherfactsinthesameuniverse,andinparticularmayhavesomethingtodowithdeterminingthedistanceatwhichtwomoleculesinthatuniverseshalllieapart。Ifthisisso,thencommon-sense,thoughtheintimatenatureofcausalityandoftheconnectionofthingsintheuniverseliesbeyondherpitifullyboundedhorizon,hastherootandgistofthetruthinherhandswhensheobstinatelyholdstoitthatfeelingsandideasarecauses。Howeverinadequateourideasofcausalefficacymaybe,wearelesswideofthemarkwhenwesaythatourideasandfeelingshaveit,thantheAutomatistsarewhentheysaytheyhaven’tit。Asinthenightallcatsaregray,sointhedarknessofmetaphysicalcriticismallcausesareobscure。Butonehasnorighttopullthepalloverthepsychichalfofthesubjectonly,astheautomatistsdo,andtosaythatthatcausationisunintelligible,whilstinthesamebreathonedogmatizesaboutmaterialcausationasifHume,Kant,andLotzehadneverbeenborn。Onecannotthusblowhotandcold。Onemustbeimpartiallynaiforimpartiallycritical。Ifthelatter,thereconstructionmustbethorough-goingor’metaphysical,’andwillprobablypreservethecommon-senseviewthatideasareforces,insometranslatedform。ButPsychologyisamerenaturalscience,acceptingcertaintermsuncriticallyasherdata,andstoppingshortofmetaphysicalreconstruction。Likephysics,shemustbenaï;ve;andifshefindsthatinherverypeculiarfieldofstudyideasseemtobecauses,shehadbettercontinuetotalkofthemassuch。Shegainsabsolutelynothingbyabreachwithcommon-senseinthismatter,andsheloses,tosaytheleast,allnaturalnessofspeech。Iffeelingsarecauses,ofcoursetheireffectsmustbefurtherancesandcheckingsofinternalcerebralmotions,ofwhichinthemselvesweareentirelywithoutknowledge。Itisprobable[p。138]thatforyearstocomeweshallhavetoinferwhathappensinthebraineitherfromourfeelingsorfrommotoreffectswhichweobserve。Theorganwillbeforusasortofvatinwhichfeelingsandmotionssomehowgoonstewingtogether,andinwhichinnumerablethingshappenofwhichwecatchbutthestatisticalresult。Why,underthesecircumstances,weshouldbeaskedtoforswearthelanguageofourchildhoodIcannotwellimagine,especiallyasitisperfectlycompatiblewiththelanguageofphysiology。Thefeelingscanproducenothingabsolutelynew,theycanonlyreinforceandinhibitreflexcurrents,andtheoriginalorganizationbyphysiologicalforcesoftheseinpathsmustalwaysbetheground-workofthepsychologicalscheme。
Myconclusionisthattourgetheautomaton-theoryuponus,asitisnowurged,onpurelyaprioriandquasi-metaphysicalgrounds,isanunwarrantableimpertinenceinthepresentstateofpsychology。REASONSAGAINSTTHETHEORY。
Buttherearemuchmorepositivereasonsthanthiswhyweoughttocontinuetotalkinpsychologyasifconsciousnesshadcausalefficacy。Theparticularsofthedistributionofconsciousness,sofarasweknowthem,pointtoitsbeingefficacious。Letustracesomeofthem。
Itisverygenerallyadmitted,thoughthepointwouldbehardtoprove,thatconsciousnessgrowsthemorecomplexandintensethehigherweriseintheanimalkingdom。Thatofamanmustexceedthatofanoyster。Fromthispointofviewitseemsanorgan,superaddedtotheotherorganswhichmaintaintheanimalinthestruggleforexistence;andthepresumptionofcourseisthatishelpshiminsomewayinthestruggle,justastheydo。Butitcannothelphimwithoutbeinginsomewayefficaciousandinfluencingthecourseofhisbodilyhistory。Ifnowitcouldbeshowninwhatwayconsciousnessmighthelphim,andif,moreover,thedefectsofhisotherorgans(whereconsciousnessismostdeveloped)aresuchastomakethemneedjustthekindofhelpthatconsciousnesswouldbringprovideditwereefficacious;why,thentheplausibleinfer-[p。139]encewouldbethatitcamejustbecauseofitsefficacy-inotherwords,itsefficacywouldbeinductivelyproved。
Nowthestudyofthephenomenaofconsciousnesswhichweshallmakethroughouttherestofthisbookwillshowusthatconsciousnessisatalltimesprimarilyaselectingagency。[5]Whetherwetakeitinthelowestsphereofsense,orinthehighestofintellection,wefinditalwaysdoingonething,choosingoneoutofseveralofthematerialssopresentedtoitsnotice,emphasizingandaccentuatingthatandsuppressingasfaraspossiblealltherest。Theitememphasizedisalwaysincloseconnectionwithsomeinterestfeltbyconsciousnesstobeparamountatthetime。
Butwhatarenowthedefectsofthenervoussysteminthoseanimalswhoseconsciousnessseemsmosthighlydeveloped?Chiefamongthemmustbeinstability。Thecerebralhemispheresarethecharacteristically’high’nerve-centres,andwesawhowindeterminateandunforeseeabletheirperformanceswereincomparisonwiththoseofthebasalgangliaandthecord。Butthisveryvaguenessconstitutestheiradvantage。Theyallowtheirpossessortoadapthisconducttotheminutestalterationsintheenvironingcircumstances,anyoneofwhichmaybeforhimasign,suggestingdistantmotivesmorepowerfulthananypresentsolicitationsofsense。Itseemsasifcertainmechanicalconclusionsshouldbedrawnfromthisstateofthings。Anorganswayedbyslightimpressionsisanorganwhosenaturalstateisoneofunstableequilibrium。Wemayimaginethevariouslinesofdischargeinthecerebrumtobealmostonaparinpointofpermeability-whatdischargeagivensmallimpressionwillproducemaybecalledaccidental,inthesenseinwhichwesayitisamatterofaccidentwhetherarain-dropfallingonamountainridgedescendtheeasternorthewesternslope。Itisinthissensethatwemaycallitamatterofaccidentwhetherachildbeaboyoragirl。Theovumissounstableabodythatcertaincausestoominuteforourapprehensionmayatacertainmomenttipitonewayortheother。Thenaturallawofanorganconstitutedafterthis[p。140]
fashioncanbenothingbutalawofcaprice。Idonotseehowonecouldreasonablyexpectfromitanycertainpursuanceofusefullinesofreaction,suchasthefewandfatallydeterminedperformancesofthelowercentresconstitutewithintheirnarrowsphere。Thedilemmainregardtothenervoussystemseems,inshort,tobeofthefollowingkind。Wemayconstructonewhichwillreactinfalliblyandcertainly,butitwillthenbecapableofreactingtoveryfewchangesintheenvironment-itwillfailtobeadaptedtoalltherest。Wemay,ontheotherhand,constructanervoussystempotentiallyadaptedtorespondtoaninfinitevarietyofminutefeaturesinthesituation;butitsfallibilitywillthenbeasgreatasitselaboration。Wecanneverbesurethatitsequilibriumwillbeupsetintheappropriatedirection。Inshort,ahighbrainmaydomanythings,andmaydoeachofthemataveryslighthint。Butitshair-triggerorganizationmakesofitahappy-go-lucky,hit-or-missaffair。Itisaslikelytodothecrazyasthesanethingatanygivenmoment。Alowbraindoesfewthings,andindoingthemperfectlyforfeitsallotheruse。Theperformancesofahighbrainarelikedicethrownforeveronatable。Unlesstheybeloaded,whatchanceistherethatthehighestnumberwillturnupoftenerthanthelowest?
Allthisissaidofthebrainasaphysicalmachinepureandsimple。Canconsciousnessincreaseitsefficiencybyloadingitsdice?Suchistheproblem。
Loadingitsdicewouldmeanbringingamoreorlessconstantpressuretobearinfavorofthoseofitsperformanceswhichmakeforthemostpermanentinterestsofthebrain’sowner;itwouldmeanaconstantinhibitionofthetendenciestostrayaside。
Well,justsuchpressureandsuchinhibitionarewhatconsciousnessseemstobeexertingallthewhile。Andtheinterestsinwhosefavoritseemstoexertthemareitsinterestsanditsalone,interestswhichitcreates,andwhich,butforit,wouldhavenostatusintherealmofbeingwhatever。Wetalk,itistrue,whenwearedarwinizing,asifthemerebodythatownsthebrainhadinterests;wespeakabouttheutilitiesofitsvariousorgansandhowtheyhelporhinderthebody’ssurvival;andwetreatthesurvivalas[p。141]ifitwereanabsoluteend,existingassuchinthephysicalworld,asortofactualshould-be,presidingovertheanimalandjudginghisreactions,quiteapartfromthepresenceofanycommentingintelligenceoutside。Weforgetthatintheabsenceofsomesuchsuperaddedcommentingintelligence(whetheritbethatoftheanimalitself,oronlyoursorMr。Darwin’s),thereactionscannotbeproperlytalkedofas’useful’or’hurtful’atall。Consideredmerelyphysically,allthatcanbesaidofthemisthatiftheyoccurinacertainwaysurvivalwillasamatteroffactprovetobetheirincidentalconsequence。Theorgansthemselves,andalltherestofthephysicalworld,will,however,allthetimebequiteindifferenttothisconsequence,andwouldquiteascheerfully,thecircumstanceschanged,compasstheanimal’sdestruction。Inaword,survivalcanenterintoapurelyphysiologicaldiscussiononlyasanhypothesismadebyanonlookeraboutthefuture。Butthemomentyoubringaconsciousnessintothemidst,survivalceasestobeamerehypothesis。Nolongerisit,"ifsurvivalistooccur,thensoandsomustbrainandotherorganswork。"Ithasnowbecomeanimperativedecree:"Survivalshalloccur,andthereforeorgansmustsowork!"Realendsappearforthefirsttimenowupontheworld’sstage。Theconceptionofconsciousnessasapurelycognitiveformofbeing,whichisthepetwayofregardingitinmanyidealistic-modernaswellasancientschools,isthoroughlyanti-psychological,astheremainderofthisbookwillshow。Everyactuallyexistingconsciousnessseemstoitselfatanyratetobeafighterforends,ofwhichmany,butforitspresence,wouldnotbeendsatall。Itspowersofcognitionaremainlysubservienttotheseends,discerningwhichfactsfurtherthemandwhichdonot。
Nowletconsciousnessonlybewhatitseemstoitself,anditwillhelpaninstablebraintocompassitsproperends。Themovementsofthebrainperseyieldthemeansofattainingtheseendsmechanically,butonlyoutofalotofotherends,ifsotheymaybecalled,whicharenottheproperonesoftheanimal,butoftenquiteopposed。Thebrainisaninstrumentofpossibilities,butofnocertainties。Buttheconsciousness,withitsownendspresenttoit,and[p。142]knowingalsowellwhichpossibilitiesleadtheretoandwhichaway,will,ifendowedwithcausalefficacy,reinforcethefavorablepossibilitiesandrepresstheunfavorableorindifferentones。Thenerve-currents,coursingthroughthecellsandfibres,mustinthiscasebesupposedstrengthenedbythefactoftheirawakingoneconsciousnessanddampeningbyawakeninganother。Howsuchreactionoftheconsciousnessuponthecurrentsmayoccurmustremainatpresentunsolved:itisenoughformypurposetohaveshownthatitmaynotuselesslyexist,andthatthematterislesssimplethanthebrain-automatistshold。
Allthefactsofthenaturalhistoryofconsciousnesslendcolortothisview。Consciousness,forexample,isonlyintensewhennerve-processesarehesitant。Inrapid,automatic,habitualactionitsinkstoaminimum。
Nothingcouldbemorefittingthanthis,ifconsciousnesshavetheteleologicalfunctionwesuppose;nothingmoremeaningless,ifnot。Habitualactionsarecertain,andbeinginnodangerofgoingastrayfromtheirend,neednoextraneoushelp。Inhesitantaction,thereseemmanyalternativepossibilitiesoffinalnervousdischarge。Thefeelingawakenedbythenascentexcitementofeachalternativenerve-tractseemsbyitsattractiveorrepulsivequalitytodeterminewhethertheexcitementshallabortorshallbecomecomplete。
Whereindecisionisgreat,asbeforeadangerousleap,consciousnessisagonizinglyintense。Feeling,fromthispointofview,maybelikenedtoacross-sectionofthechainofnervousdischarge,ascertainingthelinksalreadylaiddown,andgropingamongthefreshendspresentedtoitfortheonewhichseemsbesttofitthecase。
Thephenomenaof’vicariousfunction’whichwestudiedinChapterII
seemstoformanotherbitofcircumstantialevidence。Amachineinworkingorderactsfatallyinoneway。Ourconsciousnesscallsthistherightway。
Takeoutavalve,throwawheeloutofgearorbendapivot,anditbecomesadifferentmachine,actingjustasfatallyinanotherwaywhichwecallthewrongway。Butthemachineitselfknowsnothingofwrongorright:
matterhasnoidealstopursue。Alocomotivewillcarryitstrain[p。143]
throughanopendrawbridgeascheerfullyastoanyotherdestination。
Abrainwithpartofitscoopedoutisvirtuallyanewmachine,andduringthefirstdaysaftertheoperationfunctionsinathoroughlyabnormalmanner。Asamatteroffact,howeveritsperformancesbecomefromdaytodaymorenormal,untilatlastapractisedeyemaybeneededtosuspectanythingwrong。Someoftherestorationisundoubtedlydueto’inhibitions’
passingaway。Butiftheconsciousnesswhichgoeswiththerestofthebrain,betherenotonlyinordertotakecognizanceofeachfunctionalerror,butalsotoexertanefficientpressuretocheckitifitbeasinofcommission,andtolendastrengtheninghandifitbeaweaknessorsinofomission,-nothingseemsmorenaturalthanthattheremainingparts,assistedinthisway,shouldbyvirtueoftheprincipleofhabitgrowbacktotheoldteleologicalmodesofexerciseforwhichtheywereatfirstincapacitated。Nothing,onthecontrary,seemsatfirstsightmoreunnaturalthanthattheyshouldvicariouslytakeupthedutiesofapartnowlostwithoutthosedutiesassuchexertinganypersuasiveorcoerciveforce。AttheendofChapterXXVIIshallreturntothisagain。
Thereisyetanothersetoffactswhichseemexplicableonthesuppositionthatconsciousnesshascausalefficacy。Itisawell-knownfactthatpleasuresaregenerallyassociatedwithbeneficial,painswithdetrimental,experiences。Allthefundamentalvitalprocessesillustratethislaw。
Starvation,suffocation,privationoffood,drinkandsleep,workwhenexhausted,burns,wounds,inflammation,theeffectsofpoison,areasdisagreeableasfillingthehungrystomach,enjoyingrestandsleepafterfatigue,exerciseafterrest,andasoundskinandunbrokenbonesatalltimes,arepleasant。
Mr。Spencerandothershavesuggestedthatthesecoincidencesaredue,nottoanypre-establishedharmony,buttothemereactionofnaturalselectionwhichwouldcertainlykilloffinthelong-runanybreedofcreaturestowhomthefundamentallynoxiousexperienceseemedenjoyable。Ananimalthatshouldtakepleasureinafeel-[p。144]lingofsuffocationwould,ifthatpleasurewereefficaciousenoughtomakehimimmersehisheadinwater,enjoyalongevityoffourorfiveminutes。Butifpleasuresandpainshavenoefficacy,onedoesnotsee(withoutsomesuchà;priorirationalharmonyaswouldbescoutedbythe’scientific’championsoftheautomaton-theory)whythemostnoxiousacts,suchasburning,mightnotgivethrillsofdelight,andthemostnecessaryones,suchasbreathing,causeagony。Theexceptionstothelaware,itistrue,numerous,butrelatetoexperiencesthatareeithernotvitalornotuniversal。Drunkenness,forinstance,whichthoughnoxious,istomanypersonsdelightful,isaveryexceptionalexperience。But,astheexcellentphysiologistFickremarks,ifallriversandspringsranalcoholinsteadofwater,eitherallmenwouldnowbeborntohateitorournerveswouldhavebeenselectedsoastodrinkitwithimpunity。Theonlyconsiderableattempt,infact,thathasbeenmadetoexplainthedistributionofourfeelingsisthatofMr。GrantAlleninhissuggestivelittleworkPhysiologicalAesthetics;andhisreasoningisbasedexclusivelyonthatcausalefficacyofpleasuresandpainswhichthe’double-aspect’partisanssostrenuouslydeny。
Thus,them,fromeverypointofviewthecircumstantialevidenceagainstthattheoryisstrong。Apriorianalysisofbothbrain-actionandconsciousactionshowsusthatifthelatterwereefficaciousitwould,byitsselectiveemphasis,makeamendsfortheindeterminatenessoftheformer;whilstthestudyaposterioriofthedistributionofconsciousnessshowsittobeexactlysuchaswemightexpectinanorganaddedforthesakeofsteeringanervoussystemgrowntoocomplextoregulateitself。Theconclusionthatitisusefulis,afterallthis,quitejustifiable。
But,ifitisuseful,itmustbesothroughitscausalefficaciousness,andtheautomaton-theorymustsuccumbtothetheoryofcommonsense。I,atanyrate(pendingmetaphysicalreconstructionsnotyetsuccessfullyachieved),shallhavenohesitationinusingthelanguageofcommon-sensethroughoutthisbook。Footnotes[1]TheTheoryofPractice,vol。,p。[sic]
[2]Thepresentwriterrecallshowin1869,whenstillamedicalstudent,hebegantowriteanessayshowinghowalmosteveryonewhospeculatedaboutbrain-processesillicitlyinterpolatedintohisaccountofthemlinksderivedfromtheentirelyheterogeneousuniverseofFeeling。Spencer,Hodgson(inhisTimeandSpace),Maudsley,LockhartClarke,Bain,Dr。Carpenter,andotherauthorswerecitedashavingbeenguiltyoftheconfusion。Thewritingwassoonstoppedbecauseheperceivedthattheviewwhichhewasupholdingagainsttheseauthorswasapureconception,withnoproofstobeadducedofitsreality。Lateritseemedtohimthatwhateverproofsexistedreallytoldinfavoroftheirview。
[3]Chas。Mercier:TheNervousSystemandtheMind(1888)。p。9。
[4]Op。cit。p。11。
[5]SeeinparticulartheendofChapterIX。
ClassicsintheHistoryofPsychology——James(1890)Chapter7ThePrinciplesofPsychologyWilliamJames(1890)CHAPTERVIITheMethodsandSnaresofPsychologyWehavenowfinishedthephysiologicalpreliminariesofoursubjectandmustintheremainingchaptersstudythementalstatesthemselveswhosecerebralconditionsandconcomitantswehavebeenconsideringhitherto。
Beyondthebrain,however,thereisanouterworldtowhichthebrain-statesthemselves’correspond。’Anditwillbewell,ereweadvancefarther,tosayawordabouttherelationofthemindtothislargersphereofphysicalfact。PSYCHOLOGYISANATURALSCIENCE。Thatis,themindwhichthepsychologiststudiesisthemindofdistinctindividualsinhabitingdefiniteportionsofarealspaceandofarealtime。Withanyothersortofmind,absoluteIntelligence,Mindunattachedtoaparticularbody,orMindnotsubjecttothecourseoftime,thepsychologistassuchhasnothingtodo。’Mind,’inhismouth,isonlyaclassnameforminds。FortunatewillitbeifhismoremodestinquiryresultinanygeneralizationswhichthephilosopherdevotedtoabsoluteIntelligenceassuchcanuse。
Tothepsychologist,then,themindshestudiesareobjects,inaworldofotherobjects。Evenwhenheintrospectivelyanalyzeshisownmind,andtellswhathefindsthere,hetalksaboutitinanobjectiveway。Hesays,forinstance,thatundercertaincircumstancesthecolorgrayappearstohimgreen,andcallstheappearanceanillusion。Thisimpliesthathecomparestwoobjects,arealcolorseenunderconditions,andamentalperceptionwhichhebelievestorepresentit,andthathedeclarestherelationbetweenthemtobeofacertainkind。Inmakingthiscriticaljudgment,thepsychologiststandsasmuchoutsideoftheperceptionwhichhecriticisesashedoesofthecolor。Botharehisobjects。Andifthisistrueofhimwhen[p。184]hereflectsonhisownconsciousstates,howmuchtruerisitwhenhetreatsofthoseofothers!InGermanphilosophysinceKantthewordErkenntnisstheorie,criticismofthefacultyofknowledge,playsagreatpart。NowthepsychologistnecessarilybecomessuchanErkenntnisstheoretiker。ButtheknowledgehetheorizesaboutisnotthebarefunctionofknowledgewhichKantcriticises-hedoesnotinquireintothepossibilityofknowledgeü;berhaupt。Heassumesittobepossible,hedoesnotdoubtitspresenceinhimselfatthemomenthespeaks。Theknowledgehecriticisesistheknowledgeofparticularmenabouttheparticularthingsthatsurroundthem。Thishemay,uponoccasion,inthelightofhisownunquestionedknowledge,pronouncetrueorfalse,andtracethereasonsbywhichithasbecomeoneortheother。
Itishighlyimportantthatthisnatural-sciencepointofviewshouldbeunderstoodattheoutset。Otherwisemoremaybedemandedofthepsychologistthanheoughttobeexpectedtoperform。
AdiagramwillexhibitmoreemphaticallywhattheassumptionsofPsychologymustbe:
1ThePsychologist2TheThoughtStudied3TheThought’sObject4ThePsycholo-gist’sRealityThesefoursquarescontaintheirreducibledataofpsychology。No。1,thepsychologist,believesNos。2,3,and4,whichtogetherformhistotalobject,toberealities,andreportsthemandtheirmutualrelationsastrulyashecanwithouttroublinghimselfwiththepuzzleofhowhecanreportthematall。Aboutsuchultimatepuzzlesheinthemainneedtroublehimselfnomorethanthegeometer,thechemist,orthebotanistdo,whomakepreciselythesameassumptionsashe。[1]
Ofcertainfallaciestowhichthepsychologistisexposedbyreasonofhispeculiarpointofview-thatofbeinga[p。185]reporterofsubjectiveaswellasofobjectivefacts,wemustpresentlyspeak。Butnotuntilwehaveconsideredthemethodsheusesforascertainingwhatthefactsinquestionare。THEMETHODSOFINVESTIGATION。IntrospectiveObservationiswhatwehavetorelyonfirstandforemostandalways。Thewordintrospectionneedhardlybedefined-itmeans,ofcourse,thelookingintoourownmindsandreportingwhatwetherediscover。Everyoneagreesthatwetherediscoverstatesofconsciousness。
SofarasIknow,theexistenceofsuchstateshasneverbeendoubtedbyanycritic,howeverscepticalinotherrespectshemayhavebeen。Thatwehavecogitationsofsomesortistheinconcussuminaworldmostofwhoseotherfactshaveatsometimetotteredinthebreathofphilosophicdoubt。Allpeopleunhesitatinglybelievethattheyfeelthemselvesthinking,andthattheydistinguishthementalstateasaninwardactivityorpassion,fromalltheobjectswithwhichitmaycognitivelydeal。IregardthisbeliefasthemostfundamentalofallthepostulatesofPsychology,andshalldiscardallcuriousinquiriesaboutitscertaintyastoometaphysicalforthescopeofthisbook。
AQuestionofNomenclature。Weoughttohavesomegeneraltermbywhichtodesignateallstatesofconsciousnessmerelyassuch,andapartfromtheirparticularqualityorcognitivefunction。Unfortunatelymostofthetermsinusehavegraveobjections。’Mentalstate,’’stateofconsciousness,’
’consciousmodification,’arecumbrousandhavenokindredverbs。Thesameistrueof’subjectivecondition。’’Feeling’hastheverb’tofeel,’bothactiveandneuter,andsuchderivativesas’feelingly,’’felt,’’feltness,’
etc。,whichmakeitextremelyconvenient。Butontheotherhandithasspecificmeaningsaswellasitsgenericone,sometimesstandingforpleasureandpain,andbeingsometimesasynonymof’sensation’asopposedtothought;whereaswewishatermtocoversensationand[p。186]thoughtindifferently。Moreover,’feeling’hasacquiredintheheartsofplatonizingthinkersaveryopprobrioussetofimplications;
andsinceoneofthegreatestobstaclestomutualunderstandinginphilosophyistheuseofwordseulogisticallyanddisparagingly,impartialtermsoughtalways,ifpossible,tobepreferred。ThewordpsychosishasbeenproposedbyMr。Huxley。Ithastheadvantageofbeingcorrelativetoneurosis(thenameappliedbythesameauthortothecorrespondingnerve-process),andismoreovertechnicalanddevoidofpartialimplications。Butithasnoverborothergrammaticalformalliedtoit。Theexpressions’affectionofthesoul,’’modificationoftheego,’areclumsy,like’stateofconsciousness,’
andtheyimplicitlyasserttheorieswhichitisnotwelltoembodyinterminologybeforetheyhavebeenopenlydiscussedandapproved。’Idea’isagoodvagueneutralword,andwasbyLockeemployedinthebroadestgenericway;butnotwithstandinghisauthorityithasnotdomesticateditselfinthelanguagesoastocoverbodilysensations。Ithasnoopprobriousconnotationsuchas’feeling’has,anditimmediatelysuggeststheomnipresenceofcognition(orreferencetoanobjectotherthanthementalstateitself),whichweshallsoonseetobeofthementallife’sessence。Butcantheexpression’thoughtofatoothache’eversuggesttothereadertheactualpresentpainitself?Itishardlypossible;andwethusseemabouttobeforcedbackonsomepairoftermslikeHume’s’impressionandidea,’orHamilton’s’presentationandrepresentation,’ortheordinary’feelingandthought,’ifwewishtocoverthewholeground。
Inthisquandarywecanmakenodefinitivechoice,butmust,accordingtotheconvenienceofthecontext,usesometimesone,sometimesanotherofthesynonymsthathavebeenmentioned。MyownpartialityisforeitherFEELINGorTHOUGHT。Ishallprobablyoftenusebothwordsinawidersensethanusual,andalternatelystartletwoclassesofreadersbytheirunusualsound;butiftheconnectionmakesitclearthatmentalstatesatlarge,irrespec-[p。187]tiveoftheirkind,aremeant,thiswilldonoharm,andmayevendosomegood。[2]
Theinaccuracyofintrospectiveobservationhasbeenmadeasubjectofdebate。Itisimportanttogainsomefixedideasonthispointbeforeweproceed。
ThecommonestspiritualisticopinionisthattheSoulorSubjectofthementallifeisametaphysicalentity,inaccessibletodirectknowledge,andthatthevariousmentalstatesandoperationsofwhichwereflectivelybecomeawareareobjectsofaninnersensewhichdoesnotlayholdoftherealagentinitself,anymorethansightorhearinggivesusdirectknowledgeofmatterinitself。Fromthispointofviewintrospectionis,ofcourse,incompetenttolayholdofanythingmorethantheSoul’sphenomena。Buteventhenthequestionremains,Howwellcanitknowthephenomenathemselves?
Someauthorstakehighgroundhereandclaimforitasortofinfallibility。
ThusUeberweg:
"Whenamentalimage,assuch,istheobjectofmyapprehension,thereisnomeaninginseekingtodistinguishitsexistenceinmyconsciousness(inme)fromitsexistenceoutofmyconsciousness(initself);fortheobjectapprehendedis,inthiscase,onewhichdoesnotevenexist,astheobjectsofexternalperceptiondo,initselfoutsideofmyconsciousness。
Itexistsonlywithinme。"[3]
AndBrentano:
"Thephenomenainwardlyapprehendedaretrueinthemselves。Astheyappear-ofthistheevidencewithwhichtheyareapprehendedisawarrant-sotheyareinreality。Who,then,candenythatinthisagreatsuperiorityofPsychologyoverthephysicalsciencescomestolight?"
Andagain:
"Noonecandoubtwhetherthepsychicconditionheapprehendsinhimselfbe,andbeso,asheapprehendsit。Whoevershoulddoubtthiswouldhavereachedthatfinisheddoubtwhichdestroysitselfindestroyingeveryfixedpointfromwhichtomakeanattackuponknowledge。"[4]
Othershavegonetotheoppositeextreme,andmaintainedthatwecanhavenointrospectivecognitionofour[p。188]ownmindsatall。AdeliveranceofAugusteComtetothiseffecthasbeensooftenquotedastobealmostclassical;andsomereferencetoitseemsthereforeindispensablehere。
Philosophers,saysComte,[5]have"intheselatterdaysimaginedthemselvesabletodistinguish,byaverysingularsubtlety,twosortsofobservationofequalimportance,oneexternal,theotherinternal,thelatterbeingsolelydestinedforthestudyofintellectualphenomena……Ilimitmyselftopointingouttheprincipalconsiderationwhichprovesclearlythatthispretendeddirectcontemplationofthemindbyitselfisapureillusion……Itisinfactevidentthat,byaninvincibleneccessity,[sic]thehumanmindcanobservedirectlyallphenomenaexceptitsownproperstates。Forbywhomshalltheobservationofthesebemade?Itisconceivablethatamanmightobservehimselfwithrespecttothepassionsthatanimatehim,fortheanatomicalorgansofpassionaredistinctfromthosewhosefunctionisobservation。Thoughwehaveallmadesuchobservationsonourselves,theycanneverhavemuchscientificvalue,andthebestmodeofknowingthepassionswillalwaysbethatofobservingthemfromwithout;foreverystrongstateofpassion……isnecessarilyincompatiblewiththestateofobservation。But,asforobservinginthesamewayintellectualphenomenaatthetimeoftheiractualpresence,thatisamanifestimpossibility。